An Analysis of Student Achievement and Measures of Growth under \u3cem\u3eNo Child Left Behind\u3c/em\u3e by Yusim, Alexis
Lake Forest College
Lake Forest College Publications
Senior Theses Student Publications
4-13-2015
An Analysis of Student Achievement and Measures
of Growth under No Child Left Behind
Alexis Yusim
Lake Forest College, yusimag@lakeforest.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://publications.lakeforest.edu/seniortheses
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Education Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications at Lake Forest College Publications. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Lake Forest College Publications. For more information, please contact
levinson@lakeforest.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yusim, Alexis, "An Analysis of Student Achievement and Measures of Growth under No Child Left Behind" (2015). Senior Theses.
An Analysis of Student Achievement and Measures of Growth under No
Child Left Behind
Abstract
With the passing of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) has come a wave of economic analyses of education
production functions attempting to explain what factors affect pass rates and achievement gaps. Recent
legislation has also increased its emphasis on yearly growth in pass rates. This paper will examine the extent to
which school and community characteristics affect growth in student performance in several academic
subjects and grades. Using standardized test data from the Illinois State Board of Education over the period of
No Child Left Behind, I argue that there are ways to empirically re-define growth and student success that more
effectively capture NCLB’s accountability goals. The results show that there are inherent differences between
the growth definitions employed in this paper, and between the grades analyzed – specifically, several
community characteristics have reversed effects in grade 11 from in grades 3 and 8.
Document Type
Thesis
Distinguished Thesis
yes
Degree Name
Bachelor of Arts (BA)
Department or Program
Economics
First Advisor
Kent Grote
Second Advisor
Dawn-Abt Perkins
Third Advisor
Michael T. Hartney
Fourth Advisor
Robert Lemke
Keywords
No Child Left Behind, student achievement, educational policy, growth
This thesis is available at Lake Forest College Publications: http://publications.lakeforest.edu/seniortheses/57
Subject Categories
Economics | Education Economics
This thesis is available at Lake Forest College Publications: http://publications.lakeforest.edu/seniortheses/57
Lake Forest College Archives
Your thesis will be deposited in the Lake Forest College Archives and the College’s online digital
repository, Lake Forest College Publications. This agreement grants Lake Forest College the non-exclusive
right to distribute your thesis to researchers and over the Internet and make it part of the Lake Forest
College Publications site. You warrant:
• that you have the full power and authority to make this agreement;
• that you retain literary property rights (the copyright) to your work. Current U.S. law stipulates that
you will retain these rights for your lifetime plus 70 years, at which point your thesis will enter
common domain;
• that for as long you as you retain literary property rights, no one may sell your thesis without your
permission;
• that the College will catalog, preserve, and provide access to your thesis;
• that the thesis does not infringe any copyright, nor violate any proprietary rights, nor contain any
libelous matter, nor invade the privacy of any person or third party;
• If you request that your thesis be placed under embargo, approval from your thesis chairperson is
required.
By signing below, you indicate that you have read, understand, and agree to the statements above.
Printed Name: Alexis Yusim
Thesis Title: An Analysis of Student Achievement and Measures of Growth under No Child Left Behind
This thesis is available at Lake Forest College Publications: http://publications.lakeforest.edu/seniortheses/57
 
 
 
 
 
LAKE FOREST COLLEGE 
 
Senior Thesis 
 
 
 
An Analysis of Student Achievement and 
Measures of Growth under No Child Left Behind 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Alexis Yusim 
 
 
April 13, 2015 
 
 
 
The report of the investigation undertaken as a 
Senior Thesis, to carry two courses credit in 
the Department of Economics 
 
 
 
 
 ____________________________  __________________________ 
 Michael T. Orr   Kent Grote, Chairperson 
 Krebs Provost and Dean of the Faculty 
     _________________________________  
     Dawn Abt-Perkins 
      
     _________________________________  
     Michael T. Hartney 
 
     _________________________________  
     Robert Lemke
	   i	  
Abstract 
 
With the passing of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) has come a wave of economic 
analyses of education production functions attempting to explain what factors affect pass 
rates and achievement gaps. Recent legislation has also increased its emphasis on yearly 
growth in pass rates. This paper will examine the extent to which school and community 
characteristics affect growth in student performance in several academic subjects and 
grades. Using standardized test data from the Illinois State Board of Education over the 
period of No Child Left Behind, I argue that there are ways to empirically re-define 
growth and student success that more effectively capture NCLB’s accountability goals. 
The results show that there are inherent differences between the growth definitions 
employed in this paper, and between the grades analyzed – specifically, several 
community characteristics have reversed effects in grade 11 from in grades 3 and 8.  
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I. Introduction 
Over the last fifty years, federal education reform in the United States has focused 
on improving student achievement overall and closing the achievement gap, the markedly 
lower test score performance of students from minority ethnic, racial, linguistic and lower 
socioeconomic groups as compared to white, middle class counterparts.  The reported 
goal of such legislation has been to increase public confidence in the nation’s schools 
through an objective measure of achievement (test scores) and more transparency about 
school performance (report cards, letters home to parents about performance on tests). 
Federal involvement in education reform began with the passing of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) and the development of a cabinet post and a 
Department of Education.  Initially, this legislation was a response to the negative effects 
of the segregated education system of the mid-twentieth century on student learning, 
illuminated in “The Coleman Report,” and has been reauthorized and revised over the last 
half century with the goal of equalizing educational opportunity and improving the 
outcomes of public education in general. Indeed, today, ESEA is still being debated and 
revised again.  The current reform conversation about ESEA continues to focus on 
accountability measures: who or what to hold accountable, what to implement as 
accountability measures, and how to reward or punish when achievement goals are or are 
not met. All of the recent reauthorizations of ESEA have attempted to address these 
accountability issues, but none have developed a measurement system that has escaped 
criticism.  
 One reauthorization of ESEA, the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, 
used grants as incentives when districts met standards and innovated to improve 
education. In contrast, the most recent reauthorization of ESEA, the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), threatened a withholding of funds if standards were not 
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met, dramatically changing the tone of the accountability movement. NCLB raised the 
stakes on student achievement, moving from rewarding federal funding for achievement 
to withholding funding as punishment for failure to achieve. Educators, political 
organizations, and even some legislators are concerned about the serious repercussions on 
curriculum, school access, student and teacher motivation and morale, and student, 
parent, and teacher relationships as well as the continuing concern about the public’s 
confidence in the nation’s schools. 
 NCLB, like previous ESEA reauthorizations, has employed standardized tests as 
the mechanism for measuring student performance. The Act mandated that states 
individually set standards for students to aim to achieve, holding school districts 
accountable for student performance. These standards were most commonly enforced 
through state-administered tests, given to students on a yearly basis in academic subjects 
such as mathematics, English, and science, with certain scores serving as indicators of 
“passing the test.” NCLB also defined Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) as a yearly 
increase in the pass rate, or proportion of students who pass the standardized tests, and 
added funding and reporting repercussions for school districts that did not meet AYP.  
The use of AYP as the measure of student performance is controversial because it 
had several shortcomings. First of all, AYP did not account for the previous year’s pass 
rate of a district, or a district’s pass rate at the beginning of NCLB, which could have led 
to unfairly penalizing districts who started with already high pass rates and had less room 
to grow than others. Even though NCLB was aimed particularly at districts with low pass 
rates, every district, including the high-achieving ones, was subject to potential sanctions 
for not making AYP. Thus, districts with high pass rates that did not grow from year to 
year, for example, were deemed failures by NCLB. In addition, although copious 
education literature has shown that school characteristics are not the only contributors to 
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student educational performance, school districts were the only entity held accountable 
for student success. Because of these issues, NCLB has failed to capture growth in 
student performance comprehensively and is too narrow in its consideration of 
accountability. For these reasons and more, NCLB and AYP have received widespread 
criticism, which is a reason why the Act has not been easily reauthorized and continues to 
be debated and revised.  
Given the current public appetite for school accountability, it is time for better 
empirical measures than AYP for capturing achievement in progress outcomes. Thus, in 
this paper, I propose several new definitions of growth in pass rates over the period of 
NCLB’s enforcement, in order to make recommendations for future education policy.1 I 
also execute linear regressions of various community and school characteristics on these 
growth definitions for Illinois school districts in order to more holistically capture the 
factors that affect student educational improvement. This will provide further insight as 
to whether NCLB has correctly placed accountability on school districts. Through these 
analyses, I hope to answer two questions: (1) how should growth be measured to assess 
educational progress? (2) What community and school factors can be measured to 
address both accountability and improvement in student achievement outcomes?  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II details an 
educational legislative history in the United States and various econometric studies of 
determinants of student educational outcomes in order to motivate the empirical work in 
this paper. Section III outlines the various definitions of growth and variables used in 
regressions, and section IV outlines the regression strategy employed. Section V 
summarizes the results of the analysis related to pass rates, and section VI details the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I do this using aggregate data from two school years at the beginning and end of NCLB. 
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results of the analysis related to high school graduation rates. Finally, Section VII 
contains policy implications, conclusions, and proposals for future research.  
II. The Relationship of Education Reform and the Accountability 
Movement 
 
A. Federal Legislation and Closing the Achievement Gap 
 
The achievement gap, or the measurable disparity between the educational 
performance of different subgroups of the student population, has been a prevalent topic 
of national concern for the last half a century. Researchers have conducted studies 
pertaining to causes of the achievement gap between genders, races, and levels of socio-
economic status since the 1966 report “Equality of Educational Opportunity,” published 
by the US Department of Education. Led by James Coleman of Johns Hopkins 
University, this report, commonly referred to as “The Coleman Report,” presented the 
results of a national survey performed by the National Center for Educational Statistics of 
the US Department of Education on 650,000 American students. The report addressed 
four main research questions: (1) exploring to what extent students were segregated by 
racial and ethnic groups within schools, (2) whether schools offer equal educational 
opportunities, (3) how much students learn as measured by standardized achievement 
tests, and (4) what role the type of school one attends plays in one’s educational 
achievement (Coleman, 1966, pp. iii-iv). Coleman found that both school- and 
community-related characteristics contributed to academic performance in students. 
Many of the results in the report also pertained to racial differences in student 
achievement, since this report was published during the heat of the civil rights movement, 
and the majority of American youths attended recently desegregated schools with an 
overwhelming majority of white students (Coleman, 1966, p. 3). Specifically, Coleman’s 
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results indicated that black students in particular performed better in desegregated 
educational settings (Coleman, 1966, p. 29).  
The findings in the Coleman Report contributed greatly to the conversation about 
the achievement gap, which has persisted in American education. Policy makers and 
scholars have identified gaps in achievement based on race (primarily between white and 
non-white students), economic standing, sex, English language proficiency, and learning 
disabilities. These gaps have persisted in the form of standardized test performance, high 
school graduation rates and dropout rates, college completion rates, and other measures 
(Education Week). Federal legislation has aimed specifically to increase the achievement 
of the lower-performing subgroups and close the existing achievement gaps; legislation 
has held educational institutions accountable for achieving these objectives.  
Furthermore, since the Coleman Report, questions surrounding determinants of 
individual student achievement and educational achievement over various racial 
subgroups of the population have captured the attention of economists and policy makers 
at the federal and state level, who are challenged to comprehensively explain and, ideally, 
improve the educational outcomes of all American students through legislation.  
 
B. The Accountability Movement and No Child Left Behind 
Prior to the Coleman Report, President Lyndon B. Johnson passed the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), which focused on the authorization of 
grants for school programs for children from low-income households, library resources 
for students, and supplementary education services, including a platform for bilingual 
education programs. Additionally, ESEA started a precedent of accountability in 
education that has evolved through its reauthorizations. Still in effect today, this 
legislation set the stage for decades of federal investment in education reform. 
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One crucial section of ESEA was the implementation of Title I – entitled 
“Improving the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged” (ESEA) – which aimed to 
ensure that all children have an equal opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and 
achieve, at minimum, proficiency on “challenging State academic achievement standards 
and state academic assessments” (Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965). 
This goal was to be achieved in twelve ways, one of which was through closing the 
achievement gap between high- and low-performing students, especially those “between 
minority and nonminority students, and between disadvantaged children and their more 
advantaged peers” (Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965), as part of 
President Johnson’s War on Poverty initiative.2 Through the federal government, Title I 
still provides resources to states and school districts and is the largest federal program 
providing education to address the educational needs of economically disadvantaged 
children (National Center for Education Statistics, p. 417). To this day, schools are 
identified as “Title I schools” due to the racial makeup of their student populations and 
socioeconomic claims that such students qualify for certain federal funding and attention. 
Some critics of Title I would say Title I schools are under more federal scrutiny than 
others because the federal government wants to ensure that they earn the funds allocated 
through enforcing accountability practices.3 Though the original focus of Title I revolved 
around creating federal funding requirements, both Title I and ESEA have been amended 
in the following decades to place greater emphasis on student achievement and 
accountability measures, creating disproportionate pressures on schools and districts 
serving minorities and the economically disadvantaged.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Another act in Johnson’s War on Poverty was Head Start, launched by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services in 1956, which provided early childhood 
education and school preparation programs (Head Start).	  
3 Since the original implementation of Title I, accountability practices have extended to 
all schools, not just the ones receiving federal Title I grants. 
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Motivation to improve American education for all has been reinforced since the 
original installation of ESEA by international factors as well as factors within the US. For 
example, due to the impending “information age” in the early 1980s (A Nation At Risk, 
1983, p. 10) and the US’ engagement in the Cold War and an arms race with the Soviet 
Union, the United States felt pressure to outperform global competitors. With this as 
motivation, in 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education under the 
Reagan Administration published “A Nation at Risk,”4 to raise awareness about the 
failure of the American education system, and therefore the failure of the American 
workforce, relative to those of other countries. As the report states, “if only to keep and 
improve on the slim competitive edge we still retain in world markets, we must dedicate 
ourselves to the reform of our educational system for the benefit of all--old and young 
alike, affluent and poor, majority and minority” (A Nation At Risk, 1983, p. 10). Part of 
the risk that the report highlights is rooted in a threat against the promise to all citizens, 
regardless of economic status, of “a fair chance and to the tools for developing their 
individual powers of mind and spirit to the utmost” (A Nation At Risk, 1983, p. 11). The 
Commission made several recommendations in pursuit of the twin goals of “equity and 
high-quality schooling” (A Nation At Risk, 1983, p. 14) in areas such as content 
requirements, lengthening the school day and year, and raising educational standards for 
students to meet. Through its recommendations, “A Nation at Risk” certainly served as 
an influential report in the federal push to raise educational standards and the educational 
performance of all students through legislation, such as reauthorizations of ESEA. 
ESEA has been reauthorized seven times since its enactment, in the form of some 
notable federal laws. One significant reauthorization came in the form of President Bill 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Other presidential education commissions include The Truman Report of 1947, 
Eisenhower’s Committee on Education Beyond High School, Kennedy’s Task Force on 
Education, and George W. Bush’s Commission on the Future of Higher Education. 
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Clinton’s Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, which reinforced aspects of Title I, 
provided provisions for drug-free initiatives in schools and communities, made available 
professional development programs, and implemented provisions to promote school 
equity, or the notion that every student should have access to a quality education, offering 
federal funding and grants to support these initiatives (National Center for Education 
Statistics, p. 417, Roach & Elliott, 2009). It also mandated that states must set standards 
and establish assessments by 1999 in order to measure achievement starting in 2000, 
thereby increasing pressures for accountability in school districts (Bryant, Hammond, 
Bocian, Rettig, Millerm, & Cardullo, 2008). It further required that the same standards be 
enforced for Title I and non-Title I schools, thereby raising expectations for all students 
(Improving America’s Schools Act). Through its various components, the Improving 
America’s Schools Act certainly continued the accountability movement and the practice 
of associating federal funds with progress in education legislation. 
Although the Improving America’s School Act made strides in accountability and 
improving educational standards, the Bush administration decided to take this initiative 
even further with the next reauthorization of ESEA. In response to both calls for 
increased accountability in public school performance and a perceived lack of progress 
on the achievement gap, President George W. Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act 
into law as another notable reauthorization of ESEA and Title I In January of 2002. 
Public Law 107-110, known as the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), was enacted in 
order “to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a 
high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State 
academic achievement standards and state academic assessments.” The Act aimed to do 
so through creating and enforcing more demanding state standards aligned with “high-
quality academic assessments [and] accountability systems…so that students, parents, 
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and administrators can measure progress against common expectations for student 
academic achievement” (NCLB, p. 15-16). Among NCLB’s many goals was also the 
goal of “closing the achievement gap between high- and low-performing children, 
especially the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and 
between disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers,” a goal that has been at 
the forefront of federal educational legislation since the original installment of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1966 (NCLB, p. 16).  
Among the many statutes implemented by NCLB was the notion of “adequate 
yearly progress,” or AYP, as an accountability measure. According to NCLB, individual 
states were supposed to define AYP in a way that would capture the standards enacted, 
result in “continuous and substantial academic improvement for all students,” and 
measure improvement “based primarily on the academic assessments” administered by 
state governments (NCLB, p. 22). Each state was then to establish a timeline for AYP 
that would “ensure that not 12 years after the end of the 2001-2002 school year, all 
students” in elementary and secondary schools, including those with disabilities, those 
with limited English proficiency, those who are economically disadvantaged, and those 
from major racial and ethnic groups must meet or exceed the proficient levels of 
achievement that states set (NCLB, p. 23). Furthermore, at least 95 percent of the 
students in a school were required to take the standardized tests in order for the school to 
make AYP. On a standardized test, a student can receive one of four scores: exceeds 
standards, meets standards, below standards, or academic warning, with the former two 
indicating “passing the test” and the latter two indicating “failing the test.” A district’s 
“pass rate,” therefore, as defined in this paper, is the percent of students in the district 
who meet or exceed standards (i.e. the percent of students who pass the test). Thus, AYP 
could be achieved through yearly growth in a district’s pass rate.  
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NCLB enforced its requirements through sanctions that increased in severity with 
the number of consecutive years of failing to make AYP. For example, school districts 
that failed to meet AYP for two consecutive years would be identified as schools needing 
improvement, with provisions required by NCLB to do so. Further consecutive years of 
missing AYP would result in a range of federal mandates from the replacement of 
teachers to the complete restructuring of the internal organization of the school, in which 
the school could be overtaken by the state or a private management company (NCLB, p. 
60). According to Linn (2003), the severity of the NCLB sanctions for schools that 
continue to fall into the “needs improvement” category may actually have hindered 
improvements in education because they “implicitly encourage states to water down their 
content and performance standards in order to reduce the risk of sanctions for their 
schools” (Linn, 2003, p. 8). The requirements for Title I schools were even more strict 
and more strongly enforced because they received federal funding.5 With so much at 
stake for failure to meet AYP or state-set proficiency goals by the deadlines 
implemented, school districts across the country faced a situation that demanded 
significant improvements in academic performance with very serious consequences 
related to accountability. 
Linn (2003) lists several criticisms of the system of accountability implemented 
by NCLB. For example, he argues that because school districts could fall short of AYP in 
multiple ways (by not having enough students take the test, failing in any academic 
subject, or failing by subgroup), it was easy for states to inadvertently label too many 
schools as needing improvement, which had serious repercussions for states and 
individual districts. Also, steady improvements in educational performance in schools 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The distribution of funds under Title I has also been criticized. For further information, 
see “Federal Education Funding Under NCLB: Fairness Contributor or Inhibitor?” 
(2011). 
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were not recognized under NCLB unless those improvements constituted meeting AYP. 
Essentially, districts could be sanctioned for improving, but not improving enough in the 
eyes of the law. Furthermore, Linn criticizes NCLB’s system of accountability because 
while accountability should be accompanied by high aspirations, the Act’s goal of 100 
percent proficiency for all was unrealistic and likely unattainable. Because of this, NCLB 
invoked sanctions on districts for not achieving a goal that essentially could not be 
achieved. Furthermore, according to Kim and Sunderman (2005), the “disparate impact 
of NCLB on high-poverty schools” has generated a lot of the criticism of NCLB’s 
accountability requirements (Kim and Sunderman, 2005, p. 4; Orfield, Tracey, & 
Sunderman 2005).  
Many educational researchers and reformers strongly oppose NCLB for various 
reasons in addition to criticisms of AYP. Some oppose the concept of high-stakes testing, 
in which so much rides on performance on a yearly exam (Guisbond & Neill, 2004; Karp 
, 2003; Lee, 2008). Others believe NCLB has not adequately closed the achievement gap, 
and has actually, in some cases, widened it. Teachers’ unions and education agencies 
have also expressed speculation as to how to best get students to reach the high-reaching 
goals of NCLB. There is also some belief that improvement and success are not 
accurately captured through AYP, and that there are other metrics that can more 
effectively measure them (Guisbond & Neill, 2004). In this paper, I aim to answer 
whether there are better empirical ways to capture student improvement than what NCLB 
has implemented. 
While the goal of educating America’s youth is one that does deserve national 
attention, abundant research suggests that federal government has not gone about 
achieving this in the best possible way. For example, Murnane and Papay (2010) suggest 
that teachers are concerned that some incentives created by certain provisions of NCLB 
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have resulted in a reduction in the quality of education provided to students. Also, Bryant 
et al. (2008) suggest that testing pressure placed on schools and school districts may 
distract from the intentions of NCLB to induce greater student achievement. This 
distraction, they believe, could manifest itself in schools focusing on higher-achieving 
students rather than lower-achieving ones, or focusing most on students just below the 
passing threshold, in order to meet the required proportion of students passing 
standardized tests. Essentially, there is unease that AYP is defined in such a way that 
does not ensure greater achievement for all students, but rather causes gains for already 
higher-performing students, and, ironically, leaves the lower-achieving students behind, 
which does not at all achieve what NCLB sought out to achieve (see Choi, Seltzer, 
Herman, & Yamashiro, 2007; Guisbond & Neill, 2008). Critics also express concern that 
requirements revolving around test performance will cause “teaching to the test” 
throughout schools, which could inadequately prepare students for further education in 
subjects like mathematics and science (Bruning, 2006; Linn, 2003). NCLB’s emphasis on 
student test scores could also negatively affect the way we define school quality. 
Questions have arisen about whether school quality is now defined by the quality of 
teachers and resources, or by student success on standardized tests (Price, 2010; 
Chambers, 2009). 
In order to improve upon some of the aspects of NCLB that have been widely 
criticized, legislators have made efforts to write new education acts. For example, in June 
of 2013, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee introduced the 
Strengthening America’s Schools Act. This bill aimed to support educators in providing 
high-quality instruction, encourage disadvantaged students to get the help they need in 
order to succeed, assist low-performing schools, and close achievement gaps by placing 
greater emphasis on early childhood education, encouraging equity through transparency 
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and fair federal distribution of resources, and allowing schools flexibility in their efforts 
toward improvement (News From the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions 
Committee, 2013). There is no timetable as to when this bill will reach the Senate floor. 
Also, in July of 2013, the House of Representatives passed an attempt at another ESEA 
reauthorization, the Student Success Act. This bill would give states more autonomy, 
limiting federal involvement in state education policy, and providing support for charter 
schools. The bill failed in the Senate and was also opposed by teachers unions such as the 
National Education Association (National Education Association, 2013). There has 
certainly been a surge of innovative legislation since NCLB aiming to more effectively 
complete the objectives of achieving higher educational standards and closing 
achievement gaps, hopefully compensating for the shortcomings of NCLB. 
President Obama has echoed the criticisms of NCLB and made his own efforts at 
improved education legislation throughout his presidency. As the Obama administration 
has stated, “NCLB has created incentives for states to lower their standards; emphasized 
punishing failure over rewarding success; focused on absolute scores, rather than 
recognizing growth and progress; and prescribed a pass-fail, one-size-fits-all series of 
interventions for schools that miss their goals” (The White House). In order to make up 
for these perceived shortcomings of NCLB, President Obama has taken action in accord 
with the trend of legislation to improve student achievement, with a specific goal of 
raising standards in order to improve college and career readiness among American 
students (The White House).  
Among attempts to reform NCLB, President Obama launched Race to the Top as 
part of the Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Race to the Top is a contest 
administered by the US Department of Education that rewards states for innovative 
educational reforms in four key areas: development of rigorous standards, improvement 
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of data systems to inform educators and parents about student progress, support for 
educators and administrators, and increased resources for lower-performing schools. 
Rewards in the form of grants go to those states “leading the way with ambitious yet 
achievable plans for implementing coherent, compelling, and comprehensive education 
reform” (U.S. Department of Education, 2014). While 19 states have received federal 
funding so far through the program, a total of 48 states have participated in reforming 
state education laws and creating standards and reform plans (The White House). Race to 
the Top also extended to the district level in 2012, offering grants to districts that make 
further efforts to personalize learning for students “so that they can engage their interests 
and take responsibility for their success” (The White House). In this way, Race to the 
Top has relied on a different strategy to drive school improvement from that of NCLB, 
through reward rather than threatened withholding of funds, while still maintaining a 
reliance on accountability of school districts. 
Recently, state leaders from every state collaborated to develop a new set of 
national academic standards through the Common Core Standards Initiative. Sponsored 
by the National Governors Association and the Council of Chief State School Officers, 
the Common Core Standards were developed in 2009 in order to clearly express college- 
and career-readiness standards and standards in mathematics and language arts for 
students in each grade from kindergarten to 12th grade. A perceived need by legislators to 
establish a consistent, standardized national definition of educational proficiency, instead 
of allowing individual states to establish their own standards, motivated the development 
of these standards. As of 2014, 43 states have adopted the Common Core Standards, with 
the possibility of Race to the Top grants offered as an incentive to do so. Sources such as 
the National Education Association endorse them, with three-fourths of members in 
support (NEA Today).  
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Like previous reforms to NCLB, this initiative still uses test scores; the 
Partnership for the Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers, or PARCC test, the 
new national assessment set to replace previous ones implemented in individual states by 
NCLB in spring of 2015, has received wide criticism. The PARCC test is a computerized, 
adaptive exam that tests students’ attainment of the new, more rigorous Common Core 
Standards (The Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers, 2015). 
Nonprofit organizations have established strong stances against the Common Core 
Standards Initiative for an array of reasons, and parents have widely opted their children 
out of taking the PARCC test.6 This newest national education initiative is still imperfect 
and widely criticized. Legislators still have not found the answer to the question of how 
to properly assess American students and capture student improvement, implement 
educational reforms, and, in general, improve confidence in public schools.  
 
C. Illinois: A Case Study for Testing Accountability Reform 
 Illinois has been in the forefront of educational reform, making it an interesting 
state on which to focus when analyzing of educational data. In 2010, Illinois became one 
of the 43 states to adopt the Common Core Standards, and is one of 11 states that serve 
on the governing board of the Partnership for the Assessment of Readiness for College 
and Careers, the newly developed online assessment system that accompanies the 
Common Core Standards (Illinois State Board of Education, New Illinois Learning 
Standards).   
 Illinois also received a Race to the Top grant in 2011, with half of the grant 
money allocated to the 35 participating school districts that lead the way in implementing 
reforms aimed at improving student achievement and overall school performance. Illinois 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 One example of an opposing organization in Illinois is Stop Common Core Illinois. 
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has implemented various state projects to support its participating districts in the four 
areas that Race to the Top emphasizes (Illinois State Board of Education, Illinois Race To 
The Top). 
 Among Illinois’ many education initiatives is the Performance Evaluation Reform 
Act, passed under Governor Pat Quinn in 2010. This Act established the Performance 
Evaluation Advisory Council in order to advise the Illinois State Board of Education on 
how to most effectively evaluate student and school performance. It also insists that 
“performance evaluations of the principals/assistant principals and teachers of that school 
district or other covered entity must include data and indicators of student growth as a 
“significant factor,”” which remains consistent with the national trend of quantifying 
student achievement and growth (Illinois State Board of Education, Performance 
Evaluation Reform Act).  
 Because of the state’s participation in education reform and its richness of data, 
researchers have established interest in Illinois in the frame of the education production 
function. For example, William Sander published a paper in 1992 that analyzed the 
effects of various determinants such as expenditures on various outcomes, including ACT 
scores, high school graduation rates, and the percent of high school students planning to 
attend college from the 1989-1990 school year. His results indicate that expenditures, 
particularly those pertaining to the quality and quantity of teachers, do have significant 
effects on educational outcomes. Sander makes an important contribution to the literature 
because he innovatively proposes alternative measures of student educational outcomes 
that do not involve state-administered standardized test scores, which is an objective of 
this paper as well.  
 
 
	   17	  
 
D. What’s Missing From the Education Production Function 
 Since the Coleman Report’s evidence that community and school factors 
contribute to the performance of students, economists have tirelessly attempted to 
understand what particular factors affect student educational success through education 
production function estimates. Empirical estimates of the education production function 
commonly include a combination of both school factors and community factors. School 
factors usually consist of variables like instructional expenditures, teacher experience, 
teacher education, class size, minutes of instruction, and mobility rates. Researchers 
include these different school traits in production function estimates in order to capture 
the ways that schools affect student success as completely as possible. Community 
factors include racial makeup of the student body and indicators of socio-economic status 
(SES), such as average household income or the percent of students who receive free or 
reduced lunch, which are seen as the strongest predictors of educational outcomes 
(Boggess, 1998; Coleman, 1966; Hanushek, 1986; Ferguson & Ladd, 1996; Krueger, 
1999; Coates, 2003; Kinnucan, Zheng, & Brehmer, 2006; Balfanz, Legters, West, &  
Weber, 2007; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2007; Sander 1993).  
Much research over the past decade has been conducted in an attempt to evaluate the 
effects of NCLB through the lens of an education production function. For example, 
Heather Price in 2010 analyzed whether NCLB’s labeling process accurately captures 
school quality through alternative measures of school quality, standardized testing results, 
and subgroup test failure. For further examples, see Borg, Plumlee, & Stranahan, (2007); 
Neal & Schanzenbach (2007); Dee & Jacob (2011); Kinnucan, Smith, Zheng & Llanes 
(2012); Flaherty (2013). 
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Plenty of research indicates little to no relationship between school qualities and 
student success, while other research indicates a very significant relationship. For 
example, while Eric Hanushek in his 1986 paper finds no strong positive relationship 
between expenditures, teacher quality measures, or pupil-to-teacher ratios and student 
performance, others such as David Card and Allen Krueger (1992) do find significant 
relationships between indicators of school quality (captured by pupil-to-teacher ratio, 
relative teacher pay, and average term length) and the relative rate of return to education 
(Hanushek, 1986; Card & Krueger, 1992; Campbell & Lopez, 2008). Kane, Taylor, 
Tyler, & Wooten (2010) also find a relationship between measures of teacher 
effectiveness and student academic performance. Through these opposing pieces of 
research, it is clear that economists have not yet agreed on what explains student success 
– while there are some common variables that economists employ to explain educational 
outcomes, there is not a definitive list of variables that do so. Therefore, part of the 
motivation of this research is to more accurately capture student educational success and 
its determinants. 
Educational attainment of the adult population of the community is one variable 
that has rarely been featured as a SES indicator by researchers. Relatively few have 
decided to include it in their studies. For example, Gyimah-Brempong and Gyapong 
(1991) show that the local level of adult educational attainment does play an important 
role in estimating the relationship between SES characteristics and student performance. 
It would seem that communities consisting of adults with high levels of educational 
attainment would encourage their children to aim for high levels of educational 
attainment and academic achievement as well. Therefore, this variable should be an 
appropriate component of the education production function, and is included in 
regressions in this study.  
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 Much of the literature on education production functions aims to estimate the 
effects of characteristics on either test scores or pass rates, expressed on a scale from 0 to 
100 percent passing (see Lemke, Hoerandner and McMahon, 2006; Primont and 
Domazlicky, 2006; Flaherty 2013). Some also aim to do so based on the achievement gap 
itself (Chung & Konstantopoulos, 2009). A section of the literature estimates the effects 
of characteristics on growth in pass rates or test scores (Driscoll, Halcoussis & Svorny, 
2006). In this paper, I focus on growth in pass rates as the metric for student 
performance, rather than a metric like pass rates that only accounts for one year of 
testing, in order to more robustly capture student improvement than previous research. 
 In a further attempt to understand improvement in student performance, 
economists have recently increased their interest in growth models. Over the past several 
years, researchers have expressed heavy interest in exploring various projection models 
that the federal government has allowed some states to implement through the NCLB 
Growth Model Pilot Program (Dunn, & Allen, 2009; Weiss, & May, 2012). Several 
papers investigate value-added assessment as an alternative way to measure student 
learning (see Hanushek, & Taylor, 1990; Harris, 2009; Misco, 2008; Ehlert, Koedel, 
Parsons, & Podgursky, 2013). Value-added assessment essentially asks “whether a 
particular school, classroom, and teacher did what they were supposed to do for the 
achievement growth of individual students” rather than assess achievement growth using 
school or district data (Misco, 2008, p. 11). Value-added assessment could be 
administered at the school or teacher level. This proposed method of accountability faces 
both support and opposition due to implications this type of evaluation could have for 
individual teachers and its statistical validity (Misco, 2008; Harris, 2009). Murphy (2012) 
analyzes arguments for and against the use of value added assessment. Researchers view 
value added models favorably against attainment-based accountability systems, such as 
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AYP, because they portray a “clearer picture of student learning,” following a cohort of 
students over time (Murphy, 2012, p. 5). Also, evidence shows that these models depict 
teachers has having significant, lasting effects on student learning. However, value added 
models are criticized for many reasons, including widespread doubt about model 
specification and the ways in which teachers can be unfairly criticized because of the 
students they teach. For example, teachers who teach the neediest students would likely 
be evaluated very harshly under this system due to factors that they do not control, such 
as student background variables, which value added measurements ignore. 
Neal (2010) criticizes value-added models through an economic lens, suggesting 
that value-added models rely on an underlying assumption that test scores are reported 
such that a one point gain for a student “is of equal value to society regardless of the 
student’s prior level of skill,” (Neal, 2010, p. 129). He continues to argue that an increase 
in a student’s math score from 120 to 122 should not be valued the same way as an 
increase from 220 to 222, for example, and that the way that value added models 
incorrectly weight student gains equally harm their validity as measures of school quality 
and performance. Due to this scrutiny, value-added assessment is arguably not the most 
appropriate way to evaluate the effectiveness of schools and teachers; it is not right to 
evaluate the quality of individual teachers based on the performance of individual 
students on standardized tests because teachers are not the only factor affecting student 
educational performance. Thus, other methods of assessing student growth over time are 
necessary – this motivates the definitions of growth proposed in this paper, which 
account for progress relative to how well students were performing at the beginning of 
the period of analysis. 
In addition to questions surrounding how to best measure growth, economists 
question whether test scores are even the best measure of student achievement. As Card 
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and Krueger suggest, “one can argue that test scores are an imperfect measure of school 
performance” (Card & Krueger, 1992, pg 2). Wenger (2000) also hypothesizes that 
schools actually face a trade-off between test scores and graduation rates in that schools 
may have to sacrifice the former in order to use resources to increase the latter. To 
compensate for this, a portion of the literature sees high school graduation rates as the 
best educational output measure, rather than a measure based solely on test scores 
(Boggess, 1998; Goldin, 1998; Chen, 2011; Heckman & LaFonatine, 2012; Iatarola & 
Reubenstein, 2007; Murnane, 2013). Thus, this paper also features regressions using 
growth in high school graduation rates over time as an output variable, as an alternative 
measure of student improvement that does not involve standardized test pass rates. 
 Economists have conducted studies pertaining to the education production 
function at the individual, school, and district level in order to capture the effects of 
inputs on educational success at various levels. For example, May and Weiss chose to do 
a study at the individual level as an alternative performance measure due to a belief that 
“school-level changes in proficiency rates are statistically unreliable and do not reflect 
true school improvement, in part because they compare different cohorts of students,” 
which results in natural sampling variability, among other consequences (May & Weiss, 
2012, p. 45). Because the data from the Illinois State Board of Education gives data at the 
school and district level, but only presents expenditure data at the district level, I have 
conducted a district level analysis. 
 Another area of interest in this paper is the own-race effect, or the extent to which 
the presence of a particular subgroup in a district affects that subgroup’s educational 
outcomes (Lemke & Yusim, 2014). Including this will illuminate even more about the 
determinants of educational success among various subgroups of the population, 
particularly the role of diversity in student educational performance. 
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Economic research has painted an incomplete picture of student educational 
success because researchers still have not collectively determined how to best capture 
student educational success or what affects it – this is why economists still participate in 
ongoing research attempting to explain it. While I follow the literature by incorporating 
common school and community variables, I also contribute to the literature by 
introducing a seldom-used variable to capture socio-economic status, the local BA rate, 
and various measures of growth as output variables to capture student achievement in my 
production function estimate. 
   
III. Data 
The analyses in this paper use data from Illinois public school districts of all types 
(i.e. elementary, middle school, high school, and unit). The data comes in aggregate from 
the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) for the 2002-2003 and 2011-2012 school 
years.7 The ISBE assesses Illinois students using two different standardized tests: the 
Illinois State Achievement Test (ISAT) and the Prairie State Achievement Examination 
(PSAE). The ISAT is administered to students in grades 3 through 8, while the PSAE is 
given to students in grade11. The ISAT tests reading and mathematics in grades 3 
through 8 and tests science in grades 4 and 7 (Illinois State Board of Education, Illinois 
Standard Achievement Test). The PSAE includes the ACT plus Writing (for which a 
student could choose to submit his/her score to colleges), a science assessment developed 
by the ISBE, and two sections in Reading for Information and Applied Mathematics 
(Illinois State Board of Education, Prairie State Achievement Examination). Both exams 
are administered to students in the spring of the academic year. In this paper, I analyze 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 These years were chosen for this study because they reflect the first year of NCLB’s 
implementation and the most recent year of data I could obtain, thus spanning almost the 
entire duration of the Act.	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performance on the reading and mathematics sections of the ISAT for third and eighth 
graders, and of the PSAE for eleventh graders as my measure of student academic 
outcomes. 
Data for this paper was assembled from a few sources. The first is the Illinois State 
Report Cards for the 2002-2003 and 2011-2012 school years, which the Illinois State 
Board of Education produced under mandate from NCLB. The second is the United 
States Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, which provides a five-year 
estimate from 2008 for the percent of adults in each school district with a bachelor’s 
degree (from now on referred to as the local BA rate). While most of the data reported in 
the Illinois state report cards is given at the state, district, and school level, expenditure 
data is only given at the state and district level. Due to this, and because the local BA rate 
is also given at the district level, I found a district-level analysis most appropriate. 
This analysis uses data from every district in Illinois in the 2002-2003 and 2011-2012 
school years, with a few exceptions. Most notably, the Chicago Public School (CPS) 
district is not included. The CPS is much larger than any other district in Illinois, as over 
twenty percent of Illinois’ population resides in Chicago. Also, the demographics of the 
residents of the district makes it very different from every other district in Illinois, and the 
presence of these differences make it logical not to include CPS in the analyses in this 
paper.  
For various reasons, a handful of school districts closed or were created over the 
period in question. Sometimes districts merged or consolidated with others; other times, 
districts that closed were not replaced at all. Those districts in the latter category are not 
included in this analysis. Of the districts that closed, only those that existed in 2003 and 
could be traced to a district that existed in 2012 were included. 
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After excluding the various categories of districts as noted above, and outlying 
districts with extremely small (under 100) or large (over 100,000) enrollments, there are 
758 districts remaining to analyze. Of these, 320 are elementary districts that serve 
kindergarten through eighth grade; 93 are high school districts; and 345 are unit districts 
that serve kindergarten through twelfth grade. In total, 114 districts are located in rural 
areas, 621 in suburban areas, and 23 are in major metropolitan areas (excluding Chicago). 
It is possible that the school districts that closed over the period had relatively low pass 
rates, which could lead to a biased selection of districts. However, this does not appear to 
be the case, since the average pass rates of the full sample and the sample excluding the 
aforementioned districts are similar.  
The most commonly used measure of AYP is the percent of students in a district who 
meet or exceed state-determined standards (i.e. the district’s pass rate). Illinois State 
Report Cards categorize test scores into four categories: exceeds standards, meets 
standards, below standards, or academic warning. The former two groups signify 
“passing the test,” while the latter two denote “failing the test.” The pass rate, therefore, 
reflects the percent of students who “pass the test.” This paper reports pass rate data for 
the entire student body, and the white, black, and Hispanic subgroups.  
According to NCLB, states determine an “n size,” or a threshold for the number of 
students in various subgroups that would require districts to incorporate them into their 
data. The worry was that calculating AYP for very small groups could fluctuate and 
therefore be unreliable due to changes in student composition every year. Most states 
used an n size of 30 to 40 students as a minimum threshold for factoring subgroups into 
AYP calculations. The n size in Illinois during the period in question was 45 students 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2010). Thus, in Illinois, 137 and 155 districts were 
required to report results for their black and Hispanic students in grade 3 respectively in 
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both years.  Likewise, 140 and 142 districts reported grade 8 test results for their black 
and Hispanic students respectively, while 86 and 94 districts reported grade 11 test results 
for their black and Hispanic students respectively. Overall, pass rates for Illinois school 
districts increased for all students from 2002-2003 to 2011-2012, and for white, black, 
and Hispanic subgroups of students in reading and math in grades 3 and 8. The pass rates 
decreased in grade 11 for all students and all subgroups except for Hispanic students in 
math. Table 1 displays all of these trends. 
Additional trends also emerge from this data. In general, pass rates for white students 
in both 2003 and 2012 exceeded those for black and Hispanic students. Although the pass 
rates of the black and Hispanic subgroups never exceed those of the white students, the 
black and Hispanic subgroups typically experience greater margins of change in pass 
rates.  
In order to confirm that the 2012 pass rates are statistically different from those in 
2003, I conducted paired t-tests on the pass rates for both years. Reading and 
mathematics pass rates are different with 1 percent statistical significance in 2012 from 
their 2003 values in all races, grade levels, and subjects, except for grade 11 white 
students in math and grade 11 Hispanic students in reading (see Table 1).  
Table 2 shows trends related to the closing of the achievement gap, or the disparity 
between the achievement of subgroups of the population, measured by the difference in 
their pass rates. The table is split into two panels: the first contains data pertaining to the 
closing of the achievement gap between the black and white subgroups, and the second 
concerns that between the Hispanic and white subgroups. For example, in 2003, the 
difference between the grade 3 reading pass rates of the white and black subgroups was 
26.70 percentage points. This difference decreased by roughly 9.49 percentage points to 
16.59 percentage points. The negative difference in differences indicates that the 
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achievement gap between black and white students in grade 3 reading shrunk in size. 
This decrease in the achievement gap was statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
As Table 2 shows, the achievement gaps, as measured by differences in pass rates, 
decreased between black and white students in all grades and subjects except for grade 11 
math, and between Hispanic and white students in all grades and subjects. These 
differences in the differences in pass rates were all statistically significant with the 
exception of those for Hispanic and white students in grade 11.  
Along with closing the achievement gap between subsets of students, an objective of 
NCLB was to improve educational outcomes for all students, ideally to 100 percent 
proficiency on standardized tests in all districts. Thus, although Table 1 includes pass 
rates in 2003 and 2012, the analysis in the paper is primarily focused on growth in those 
pass rates. The existence of growth in student performance, reflected by growth in pass 
rates, more consistently follows the objectives of NCLB than simply using student 
performance in one year as a measure of educational success, and is thus the metric under 
analysis here.8 The question that remains, though, is how to most effectively define 
growth while staying true to the ideals of NCLB. Because of the wide criticism of AYP 
as an accountability measure, it is necessary to find an alternative, more meaningful 
empirical definition of student achievement. 
One measure that arises intuitively out of the concept of defining growth is 
approximation of the raw gap, defined as a district’s pass rate in 2012 less its pass rate in 
2003. However, this metric may not tell the full story of a district’s pass rate growth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The literature presents arguments for and against using variables related to standardized 
tests as the representative of student outcomes (I will address this further in Section VII). 
I choose to employ growth in pass rates in order to remain consistent with NCLB’s 
chosen metric. The aspect that I change is the way I empirically define growth in pass 
rates. 
	   27	  
because it does not account for a district’s pass rate at the beginning of the period under 
analysis. 
To illustrate this, consider, for example, three suburban elementary districts in 
Illinois. Ford Heights School District began in 2003 with a 24.6 percent reading pass rate 
and increased to an 81.8 percent pass rate in 2012. Chicago Ridge School District began 
with a 59.3 percent reading pass rate that increased to 75 percent. Winnetka School 
District began with a 94.6 percent reading pass rate that increased to 99.5 percent. By 
solely using the raw gap to illustrate growth, Ford Heights would seem to have 
demonstrated the most growth over the period of NCLB, with a 57.2 percentage-point 
margin of pass rate growth, while Chicago Ridge and Winnetka only experienced 
respective 15.7 and 4.9 percentage point increases. However, though the margins of 
growth for Ford Heights and Chicago Ridge exceed that of Winnetka, Winnetka ended 
the period closest to 100-percent proficiency. Considering NCLB’s overarching goal of 
having every district proficient by the end of the period, Winnetka should therefore have 
favorable progress compared to the other two from the perspective of NCLB. 
Furthermore, if the margin of growth is deemed the only metric of value, then Winnetka 
would be viewed unfavorably against these other districts since it simply had less room to 
grow than the other two. In terms of AYP, there just isn’t much more progress to be made 
once a school has reached 99.5 percent passing. Due to situations like this, other metrics 
of growth are necessary in order to reflect progress. 
In order to account for this and to provide alternative ways to best measure growth in 
order to assess progress on standardized tests, this paper employs two additional 
measures of growth in addition to the raw gap: the percentage of the gap closed, and the 
percent gain from 2003. Thus, we have the following summary of measures of growth: 
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(1)   
    
 
(2)   
 
Percent Gain =  Pass Rate2012 −  Pass Rate2003Pass Rate2003
×100  
 
 
(3)   
 
Percent Gap Closed =  Pass Rate2012 −  Pass Rate2003100 −  Pass Rate2003
×100
 
 
 
The above measures reflect, in their own ways, progress relative to where district pass 
rates started at the beginning of the period and can shed more light on improvement than 
just the raw gap. 
In addition to raw pass rates, Table 1 displays the district averages for the above 
measures of growth in both reading and math for grades 3, 8, and 11. The table displays 
these measures for all races, and for the white, black, and Hispanic cohorts. For example, 
as shown in Table 1, the grade 3 reading pass rate for black students was 46.87 percent in 
2003 and 67 percent in 2012. The pass rate grew by 19.85 percentage points from 2003 to 
2012, as shown in the “Grow” column, resulting in a percentage gain of 53.61 percent 
(“Gain” column) and 34.82 percent of the gap closed (“Gap” column). Generally, these 
measures are positive for all grades, and subjects in third and eighth grade, indicating 
student improvement over the period of NCLB. Contrarily, with the exception of 
Hispanic students in grade 11 mathematics, grade 11 pass rates move in the opposite 
direction for all races and subjects, showing decreasing pass rates by at the least 0.14 
percentage points (grade 11 math for white students) and at the most 8.29 percentage 
points (grade 11 reading for black students). That grade 11 behaves in an opposite 
fashion to grades 3 and 8 is an interesting result, and one that leaves the question of what 
 
Raw Growth =  Pass Rate2012 −  Pass Rate2003
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is so different about grade 11. I am interested in exploring what factors influence this 
behavior.9 
I am also interested in what factors determine student improvement in general, as 
measured by the various empirical definitions of growth. That is, I want to see how the 
common factors in the literature that affect pass rates also affect measures of growth. I 
use a combination of community and school characteristics to explain pass rate growth, 
percent increase in pass rates, and the percent of the gap closed through weighted linear 
regression analysis. The descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the regression 
analysis are reported in Table 3, which is split by districts that report ISAT scores for 
grades 3 and 8 and districts that report PSAE scores for grade 11. For the most part, 
values are relatively similar across the two district types, which share 345 unit districts. 
In Table 3, the BA rate, or percent of adults over 25 years of age with a bachelor’s 
degree, serves as a representative socio-economic status variable. Socio-economic status 
is commonly represented by variables pertaining to the household, such as household 
income or family structure, and even sometimes the educational attainment of parents 
(Bogess, 1998; Sander, 1992; Wenger, 2007). In this paper, I use the educational 
attainment of the entire adult population of a school district, to examine how a more 
educated population, not just more educated parents, affects growth in student 
achievement. On average, just over 21 percent of adults in Illinois districts have 
bachelor’s degrees, and this value ranges from 3.1 to 88.7 percent. As this measure is a 
five-year estimate, I assume it is constant over the entire period in question.10 The other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Recall that students in grade 11 take a different standardized test (the PSAE). Inherent 
differences between the PSAE and the ISAT could account in part for the difference in 
pass rate growth between grade 11 and grades 3 and 8.	  
10 Recall that this estimate is from 2008, the most recent year for which the American 
Community Survey offered this figure. As the other variables used are from the 2011-
2012 school year, I wanted to remain consistent and use a BA rate estimate from the most 
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community characteristic that I employ in my model is the racial makeup of the 
population, represented by the percentage of students in the district who are white, black, 
and Hispanic. This variable has multiple dimensions of importance, as achievement gaps 
have been identified between white students and both of these minorities. A presence of 
mixed achievement levels in a district could have interesting effects on the educational 
achievement of all students. Moreover, the effects of the presences of different races in a 
district could have important implications regarding diversity in schools. 
I chose several variables to represent school district characteristics; one of which is 
curricular minutes of instruction, which the ISBE only reported for grades 3 and 8. In 
both grades, English minutes of instruction decreased and math minutes of instruction 
increased by slight increments over the period. This variable will measure how the 
volumes of instruction in math and reading affect math and reading standardized test 
performance. The district mobility rate, or the rate at which students enter or leave a 
district after the first day of school, is another important district characteristic in this 
model, as it reflects the level of consistency in a student’s learning environment, which is 
likely an important determinant of educational success. Urbanicity is another reflection of 
the learning environment, represented in this study by the percentages of districts in rural, 
suburban, and urban (omitted) areas. This could also be interpreted as a measure of 
district size, with urban districts serving the largest populations, and likely being the 
greatest in size. The final reflection of the learning environment is the average class size. 
Although it is widely believed by educators and parents that smaller class sizes positively 
affect student outcomes, the literature often finds that this effect is not significant 
(Hanushek, 1989; Wenger, 2000). Moreover, Wenger (2000) suggests that a school 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
recent year possible. Averages from other years did not differ significantly from the 2008 
value. 
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environment with a lower pupil-to-teacher ratio (conceptually a similar measure to class 
size) is more of a comfort for students than a determinant of their educational success, 
which is likely why parents prefer sending their children to schools with small class sizes.  
Per pupil instructional expenditures are another school input used in this study. 
Schools incur lots of costs, but this variable solely captures the costs of instruction, such 
as teacher salaries and classroom supplies. Thus, this variable can accurately reflect a 
district’s monetary commitment to academic instruction.11 Finally, NCLB mandated that 
districts employ highly qualified teachers, or teachers who were sufficiently certified in 
their area of instruction. In Illinois, over 99 percent of teachers were highly qualified in 
2003, and this proportion increased by about half a percent by 2012. This variable is 
meant to reflect the quality of instruction, which is thought to be a major determinant of 
student educational outcomes. 
The growth measures, namely raw growth, percent gain, and percent of gap closed, 
are all measured on a 0 to 100 scale. Likewise, so are the BA rate, percent of students 
who are white, black, and Hispanic, the district mobility rate, or rate at which students 
enter or leave a school district after the start of a school year, and the percent of teachers 
who are highly qualified. Also reported as a percentage are the percent of districts located 
in center cities, suburban areas, and rural areas. The average class size is measured in the 
number of students. The curricular minutes of instruction is measured in minutes per day. 
The per pupil instructional expenditures variable is measured in thousands of dollars.12  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 It is possible, of course, that districts underreport their expenditures in order to qualify 
for need-based grants, or overreport their expenditures to make the public believe they 
spend more on instruction than in they actually do. This dataset includes data reported by 
districts, and a limitation is that any bias in this variable from inaccurate reporting is 
unknown. 
12 Per pupil instructional expenditures do not vary positively with pass rate growth. This 
should eliminate suspicion of bias in that variable. Figure 1 illustrates this.  
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IV. Identification Strategy 
 
 Weighted least squares regressions were conducted in this study in order to 
examine the effects of school district and community characteristics on the measures of 
growth defined in Section III. These regressions were done in reading and math for 
grades three, eight, and eleven: 
(4)       
 
Growth Definitioni = β0 + βX1,i + φX2,i +ε i  
 
 For districts i = 1, 2,…, n, X1 is a vector of community characteristics with 
coefficient β, X2 is a vector of school district characteristics with coefficient φ, and εi is a 
district-specific error term. The community characteristics, represented by X1, are the BA 
rate, which is the variable reflecting socio-economic status, and the racial makeup of the 
community, decomposed into the percent of students who are white (omitted), black, and 
Hispanic.13 The district characteristics, represented by X2, include class size, curricular 
minutes of instruction, the district mobility rate, the percent of teachers who are highly 
qualified, and the per-pupil instructional expenditures. All independent variables are for 
the 2011-2012 school year, except for the local BA rate, which is a five-year average 
assumed constant over the period.14 In order to control for heteroskedasticity that exists 
when the dependent variable is an average, all regressions are weighted by the square 
root of district enrollment. Extreme outliers were also dropped from the analysis.15 
 The regressions in this study are conducted on all students, and the subgroups of 
white, black, and Hispanic students for every growth measure, subject, and grade level. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Dummy urbanicity variables for whether a district is located in a rural area, suburban 
area, or central city are also included in the regressions, but omitted from the tables. 
14 I executed regressions using average values of the independent variables, and I did not 
find statistical significance in the results. So, I use the 2011-2012 values to examine how 
current district and community conditions affect growth in student performance.	  
15 For example, districts that experienced over 500% pass rate gain in reading were 
dropped. Regressions were conducted additionally dropping all outliers (i.e. districts 
three standard deviations from the mean), and the results did not significantly differ from 
those presented. 
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These regressions include the same school and community characteristics, but the 
regressions on the various racial subgroups pay particular attention to the own-race 
effects, or the effect of increases in the population of the subgroup under analysis on that 
subgroup’s educational outcomes (Lemke & Yusim, 2014). So, for example, in the 
regressions on the Hispanic subgroup, I observe the effects of increases in the percentage 
of Hispanic students in the district on Hispanic pass rate raw growth, percent pass rate 
gain, and percent of gap closed. 
 Tables 4 through 6 display the results of the above regressions with results for 
both subjects and all definitions of growth for all students in grade 3 in Table 4, grade 8 
in Table 5, and grade 11 in Table 6. As curricular minutes of instruction were not given 
for grade 11, that variable is left out of the results reported in Table 5. Other than that, the 
three tables are structured identically, with standard errors reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates. Tables 7 through 9 display the results for students in the white 
subgroup; Tables 10 through 12 for the black subgroup; and Tables 13 through 15 for the 
Hispanic subgroup. 
 
 
V. Results 
The discussion of the results begins with Tables 4, 5, and 6, which display the results 
of the regressions on all students for grades 3, 8, and 11, respectively. The discussion 
continues focusing on the regressions on the white subgroup (Tables 7, 8, and 9), 
followed by the black subgroup (Tables 10, 11, and 12), and finally the Hispanic 
subgroup (Tables 13, 14, and 15). 
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A. All Students 
1. Grade 3 
This subsection begins with a surprising result: the percent of adults in a school 
district with a bachelor’s degree (BA rate), actually has a negative effect on almost every 
definition of growth in reading and mathematics. For example, with statistical 
significance, a one percentage point increase in a district’s BA rate has a negative 0.08 
and negative 0.23 percentage point effect on the district’s growth rate and percent gain 
rate in reading, respectively. While this may seem counterintuitive at first glance, this 
effect is actually quite logical, as it is likely that students in districts with a high BA rate 
at the start of NCLB already performed at a high level, reflected in high 2003 pass rates. 
Thus, these high BA rate districts, on average, had less “room to grow” from the start. 
Considering the previous example, Winnetka’s pass rate of 94.6 percent only left it with a 
maximum possible growth rate of 5.4 percentage points and a maximum gain rate of 5.7 
percent (=5.6/94.6), while Ford Heights’ 2003 pass rate of 24.6 percent left it with a 
maximum growth of 75.4 percentage points and a maximum gain rate of 306.5 percent 
(=75.4/24.6). The data support this; for example, while third graders overall had a 2003 
average reading pass rate of 71.30 (Table 1), the 50 districts with a BA rate over 50 
percent had a higher pass rate of 84.53, and the 613 with BA rates below 50 percent had a 
slightly lower pass rate of 70.22, leaving them relatively more room to grow. By 2012, 
these pass rates increased to 80.36 overall, 90.96 for the districts with BA rates over 50 
percent, and 79.50 for the districts with BA rates under 50 percent. This resulted in raw 
pass rate growth of 9.07, 6.42, and 9.28 percentage points for each of the respective 
groups. In the eyes of NCLB, this result reflects relatively better on those districts with 
lower BA rates and more growth than those with higher BA rate since those districts 
improved their pass rates comparatively more over the period. 
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The effects of race on student improvement seem to vary by racial subgroup. For 
example, for every 1-percentage point increase in the percent of black students in the 
district, the raw growth in reading pass rates for all students was 0.20 percentage points. 
This result is statistically significant and positive at varying magnitudes for all definitions 
of growth in grades 3 and 8. From Table 1, we see that the average black reading pass 
rate in 2003 was 46.87 – lower than the all-student average, and the averages for whites 
and Hispanics. Black students also experienced greater raw growth in pass rates over the 
period than the other subgroups, with a 19.85 percentage-point increase in reading pass 
rates. So, it seems like the greater black growth relative to the other subgroups that 
contribute to a district’s overall growth has had a heightened effect on a district’s overall 
growth. Namely, black improvement in reading has increased the magnitude of the 
district’s overall improvement in reading. The same is true for percent gain and percent 
of gap closed in math and reading with the same rationale, with the exception of the math 
gap. In this case, the percent of the gap closed by black students is not always higher than 
that of the other subgroups – in fact, it is only higher than that for Hispanics (Table 1). 
However, its effect on the percent of the gap closed for all races is still statistically 
significant. 
Both the local BA rate and the percent of students who are black have opposite, 
statistically significant effects on the percent of gap closed from the raw pass rate gain 
and percent of gap closed. For example, a one-percentage point increase in the percent of 
adults with a bachelor’s degree negatively affects reading raw growth and percent gain at 
respective magnitudes of 0.08 and 0.23 percentage points, but positively affects the 
percent of gap closed at a magnitude of 0.19 percentage points. For the percent of 
students who are black, the effects on raw growth and percent gain in math and reading 
are positive, while the effects on the percent of gap closed in both subjects are negative. 
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This trend shows evidence that there are, in fact, inherent differences between the 
proposed definitions of growth. 
The percent of Hispanic students in the district also positively affects grade 3 percent 
pass rate gain, but not raw growth or percent of gap closed, at very small magnitudes. 
This is significantly negative for the percent of the gap closed, with a 1-percentage point 
increase in the percent of students who are Hispanic resulting in a widening of the gap of 
0.21 percentage points in reading and 0.37 percentage points in math. This result 
corresponds to the relatively smaller percent of gap closed by Hispanics (21.88 percent in 
reading and 20.64 percent in math) than by all other subgroups (23.75 and 36.84 percent 
for white students and 34.82 and 25.10 percent for black students in reading and math 
respectively), shown in Table 1. With this exception, diversity has positive effects on the 
overall standardized test performance of third graders in both subjects. 
According to Table 4, a one-student increase in average class size negatively affects 
every growth definition, but this effect is not statistically significant when explaining the 
percent of gap closed. The negative effect of class size on growth intuitively makes sense, 
as students are likely to respond better to more individualized attention through smaller 
class sizes.16 The effects of a one-minute increase in curricular minutes of instruction are 
extremely minimal in third grade, and are usually positive, with the exception of math 
raw growth (0.01 percentage point decrease) and percent gain (0.05 percentage point 
decrease). 
The mobility rate, or rate at which students leave a school district and enroll in a 
district after the start of the school year, can be interpreted through its effect on a child’s 
educational experience. If there is a high mobility rate, that would indicate lots of change 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This negative but non statistically significant trend is supported by the literature 
(Wenger, 2000). 
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in the makeup of classes, with students coming and going throughout the school year. If 
children benefit from consistency in the learning environment, then increases in a 
district’s mobility rate would negatively affect student outcomes.17 The data support this 
hypothesis – the district mobility rate always negatively affects all three definitions of 
growth in both subjects for grades 3, 8, and 11 (except for grade 8 reading percent gain), 
usually with statistical significance. 
The percent of teachers who are highly qualified are associated with the definitions of 
growth that are not consistently positive or negative; in third grade, these effects are 
negative for the percent of the gap closed, and positive for the other definitions in both 
subjects, but none of these estimated effects are statistically significant. This result is not 
surprising considering the lack of significant change in the percent of teachers who are 
highly qualified in Illinois over the period. Illinois non-high school districts were already 
hiring 99.27 percent of teachers who were highly qualified across districts in 2003, and 
this increased minimally to 99.87 percent in 2012 (Table 3). Since the percent of teachers 
who were highly qualified did not change much over the period – as there was just over 
half a percentage point increase –the effect of having a highly qualified teacher is not 
significant in any measure of growth in pass rates over the period in either subject. This is 
also true for grades 8 and 11, shown in Tables 5 and 6. 
Interestingly, per pupil instructional expenditures always has a negative effect on 
growth, which is not statistically significant except for raw pass rate growth in reading. 
There is more to follow analyzing this result, which has serious implications associated 
with NCLB’s funding-related sanctions.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The literature supports this; as Price (2010) states, “high mobility rates work against 
administrator and teacher efforts to establish positive school learning environments” (pg 
786). 
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2. Grade 8 
The effects of many of the school and community characteristics are similar in grade 
8 to grade 3. For example, BA rate, again, has negative effects on both reading and math 
raw growth and percent gain, and positive effects on the percent of gap closed in both 
subjects. All of these results are statistically significant.  
In terms of race, the percent of black and Hispanic students both have generally 
positive and usually statistically significant effects of varying magnitudes on growth rates 
and the percent gain in both subjects. For example, a one-percentage point increase in the 
percent of black students is expected to result in raw growth in math pass rates of 0.16 
percentage points. For every additional percent of students who are Hispanic, the percent 
gain in math pass rates is expected to increase by 0.75 percentage points. However, for 
the percent of students who are Hispanic in math, and the percent of students who are 
black and the BA rate in both subjects, the results for raw growth and percent gain are 
again reversed for percent of gap closed. These discrepancies in results between outcome 
measures give further support that the growth definitions are inherently different – 
particularly that percent of gap closed is different from raw growth and percent gain.  
The effects of average class size and per pupil instructional expenditures on the grade 
8 outcome measures are similar to those for grade 3, with varying statistical significance. 
In grade 8 math, a one minute increase in daily curricular minutes of instruction is 
expected to produce a percentage point increases of 0.18 in raw growth, 0.55 in percent 
gain, and 0.24 in percent of gap closed, all significant at the 1 percent level. Much 
smaller effects are found for reading. This result indicates that minutes of mathematics 
instruction have stronger effects on student improvement on standardized tests in 
mathematics than reading instruction does on reading tests. 
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Similar to grade 3, the district mobility rate negatively affects all three definitions of 
growth in reading and math in grade 8. Furthermore, increasing per pupil instructional 
expenditures again has a negative effect on all three definitions of growth in both 
subjects, with frequent statistical significance. In grade 8 math, for example, a one 
thousand dollar increase in per pupil instructional expenditures results in a 2.32 percent 
decrease in percent pass rates.  
 
3. Grade 11 
The grade 11 results show several trends that are often opposite of those for grades 3 
and 8. For every growth measure in both subjects, the local BA rate has a positive effect, 
while the percent of students who are black and Hispanic both have negative effects. 
Taking into account where grade 11 pass rates started in 2003, this result makes sense. In 
every racial subgroup and overall, grade 11 pass rates in 2003 were lower than those in 
grades 3 and 8 for both reading and math (Table 1). Therefore, grade 11 students 
collectively had more “room to grow” at the start of the period, so it is not surprising that 
influences such as the presence of college-educated adults in the community would 
positively affect their educational progress. 
The negative effects of the percent of students who are black and Hispanic on total 
district improvement make sense considering the measures of growth displayed in Table 
1. As shown in Table 1, grade 11 students overall actually had negative growth, showing 
declining standardized test performance over the period in question. Black students 
experienced the greatest decrease in pass rates, with pass rate gain in reading of negative 
21.82 percent and negative 6.44 percent in math. Because of the subgroup’s amplified 
decrease in pass rates in both subjects, the percent of students who are black negatively 
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affects every measure of growth in grade 11. The same could be inferred for Hispanics in 
grade 11, who also experienced negative pass rate growth in reading.  
Increasing the average class size has the expected negative effects on raw growth and 
percent gain, with positive effects on the percent of gap closed. None of these results are 
statistically significant. The district mobility rate and per pupil instructional expenditures 
show results consistent with those of the other grades as well. For per pupil instructional 
expenditures, these effects happen to be negative and statistically significant in grade 11 
math with relatively large magnitudes: namely, for every thousand dollar increase in per 
pupil instructional expenditures, math growth, percent gain, and percent of gap closed are 
expected to decrease by 0.59, 1.33, and 1.15 percentage points. So, if the effect of 
expenditures is significant at all, it is significantly negative. Increasing expenditures 
actually affects student improvement negatively. This result is true for all three grade 
levels in this study, as increasing per pupil expenditures has negative effects in every 
grade, subject, and growth definition. This could have important policy implications, 
especially with respect to NCLB, which links educational outcomes and funding. 
 
4. General Patterns in Growth Measurements for All Students 
Overall, the results show that average class size, the mobility rate, and per pupil 
instructional expenditures negatively affect the raw growth in pass rates, the percent pass 
rate gain, and the percent of gap closed in reading and math. While those effects are 
consistent for all three grades, some effects are actually reversed between grades 3 and 8 
and grade 11. Namely, the effects of the community characteristics, local BA rate, 
percent of students who are black, and percent of students who are Hispanic, are reversed 
from the grades 3 and 8 regressions to the grade 11 regressions. Based on the results 
shown, it can be inferred that there are inherent differences between grades 3 and 8 and 
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grade 11. Moreover, this trend gives even further reason for having various empirical 
definitions of growth. As a large reason for the reversed effects of these variables on 
grade 11 student improvement is due to where the student pass rates began in 2003, this 
reinforces the importance of accounting for where students started through a definition 
like percent pass rate gain, and not just using their raw growth as the only representation 
of progress. 
In all three grades and both subjects, R2 increases in value in the following order: 
percent of gap closed, raw growth, percent gain. Therefore, this model explains the least 
amount of variation in the percent of gap closed, while this model best explains that in 
the percent gain. The different explanatory power of the various definitions of growth, 
along with the observed differences in the magnitudes and signs of coefficients between 
regressions, suggests that the definitions of growth are actually inherently different. This 
may have implications for which growth measures most effectively capture student 
improvement as well. 
Furthermore, the R2 values for all regressions are quite low, implying that the 
proposed model does not fully explain growth in general, no matter how growth is 
defined. This has very important policy implications. The data shows that we cannot 
completely capture growth in student performance solely using these variables, which 
suggests that more factors contribute to student performance than what has been included 
in this model. One of the major downfalls of NCLB, therefore, is that it assumed that 
student performance could be fully explained by factors that clearly do not completely 
capture it. Policy makers, therefore must take these factors into account when deciding 
who and what to hold accountable for student performance.  
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B. Own-Race Effects for White Students 
Overall, the regressions on the growth measures for the white subgroup present 
results analogous to those of the regressions for all students. Similar to the results for all 
students, the local BA rate negatively affects white raw pass rate growth and percent pass 
rate gain but positively affects the percent of gap closed for both subjects in grades 3 and 
8. This result is statistically significant for all categories but the percent of gap closed in 
third grade math. The local BA rate again positively affects all definitions of growth in 
both subjects for grade 11 with statistical significance. Also similar to the results for all 
students, the mobility rate negatively affects all measures of growth in all three grades for 
white students, except for grade 8 reading percent pass rate gain. This is statistically 
significant in grades 3 and 8, but not in grade 11. The percent of teachers who are highly 
qualified again exhibits mixed effects on the measures of growth in both grades 3 and 8, 
and negative effects for all grade 11 measures of growth. In grade 8, per pupil 
instructional expenditures negatively affect all three measures of growth in both subjects, 
which is again consistent with the results for all students. However, this result is reversed 
in third grade; per pupil instructional expenditures positively affect measures of growth in 
both subjects with the exception of the percent of gap closed in math. These positive 
effects are not statistically significant, though. Per pupil instructional expenditures 
negatively affect grade 11 raw growth and percent gain, but positively affects the percent 
of the gap closed in both subjects. 
With the exception of reading percent pass rate gain, the own-race effect for white 
students is positive for every measure of growth in grade 3. This effect is not consistently 
positive or negative for grade 8, but it is almost always statistically significant. In grade 
11, the own-race effect is positive for every measure of growth except for math percent 
pass rate gain, and is statistically significant in reading. 
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C. Own-Race Effects for Black Students 
 The results for the subgroup of black students show both similarities to and 
differences from the results of all students and white students. For example, the local BA 
rate affects the definitions of growth differently by grade. In grade 8, the results are the 
same as for all students and white students: the local BA rate negatively affects raw 
growth and percent pass rate gain, and positively affects the percent of gap closed. 
However, in grade 3, the local BA rate only has a negative effect on percent gain, and has 
a positive effect on the other growth definitions. Also contrary to previous results, the 
local BA rate negatively affects every definition of growth in both subjects. 
 The effect of the district’s mobility rate on the definitions of growth for grade 3 is 
always negative and statistically significant at varying levels, which is consistent with the 
results for all races and for white students. In grades 8 and 11, though, the results begin to 
differ from previous results. In eighth grade, the mobility rate displays very mixed effects 
on the growth definitions, and in grade 11, the effects are always positive. Per pupil 
instructional expenditures also has a varying effect on the definitions of growth by 
subject. In grade 3, the effects on the definitions of growth in math are negative, which is 
consistent with previous results, but the effects in reading are positive. The results are 
sporadically mixed again in grade 8, and positive across all definitions of growth except 
for math percent pass rate gain in grade 11. These results are quite different from those 
for all races and white students, for whom the effect of per pupil expenditures is almost 
always negative.  
 Similar to the white subgroup, increasing the percent of students who are black 
generally positively affects all three definitions of growth for both subjects in grades 3, 8, 
and 11 for black students.  
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D. Hispanic Students 
 Like the result for all students and the white and black subgroups, the local BA 
rate negatively affects grade 3 growth definitions in both subjects. However, the effects 
on the various growth definitions in grade 8 are mixed, and are all negative in grade 11, 
similar to the results for black students. So, the presence of adults who have bachelor’s 
degrees in a school district positively affects white students and students overall, but 
negatively affects the black and Hispanic subgroups. This suggests that community 
characteristics may affect these groups of students differently. 
 The effects of the district mobility rate and per pupil instructional expenditures on 
the various growth definitions are relatively consistent with that for all students, with 
mostly negative effects for all three grade levels. The own-race effects for each grade do 
vary for the Hispanic subgroup. Increases in the percent of students who are Hispanic 
decrease all three definitions of growth in grade 3 except for math percent of gap closed, 
and in grade 11 except for reading percent of gap closed. The own-race effect is positive 
except for reading percent pass rate gain in grade 8. The effect of increases in the 
proportion of students who are Hispanic is different in grades 3 and 11 than for the white 
and black subgroups. 
 
E. Overall Patterns in Own-Race Effects for All Subgroups 
In general, the own-race effects for the white, black, and Hispanic subgroups are 
all positive, indicating that increases in the percent of students who belong to one of these 
subgroups improve the educational outcomes of the students in that subgroup. The 
positive effect of increased populations of these subgroups on their own performance 
does not imply that districts should consist of an extremely high proportion of one 
subgroup – this would only benefit that specific subgroup. Rather, the implication of this 
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for districts is that diversity matters in school districts. The presence of white, black, and 
Hispanic students is not enough; in order to maximize the performance of these 
subgroups on standardized tests, each of these groups should be well represented in 
school districts.  
Figures 2 and 3 display scatter plots for the black own-race effect on math and 
reading growth and percent pass rate gain for grades 3, 8, and 11 with quadratic best fit 
curves. The best fit quadratic shows that although overall black pass rate growth 
increases with increased presence of that subgroup, there does seem to be an optimal 
percent of black students that maximizes pass rate growth in most cases when defined by 
raw growth or percent gain.18 Based on the data, this trend could be true for the Hispanic 
and white subgroups as well. The data show, therefore, that a “healthy mix” of each of 
racial groups in school districts will generally increase the pass rate growth of each of the 
subgroups more than an under- or overrepresentation of a subgroup in a school district, 
which could translate to increased educational performance of all students in the district 
overall. 
However, diversity is a difficult concept to capture empirically, and the data 
analyzed here likely do not tell the full story of diversity effects on student educational 
success.19 These results, though, could certainly serve as a platform for future policy 
about diversity in schools. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The exceptions to this trend include the graphs of grade 3 reading raw growth, grade 3 
math raw growth, and grade 11 math percent gain versus the percent of students who are 
black. 
19 Section VII will detail plans for future empirical exploration of diversity. 
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VI. Graduation Rate Analysis 
A. Identification Strategy and Motivation 
In addition to measuring student improvement with pass rates, a section of the 
literature supports using high school graduation rates as an alternative metric for student 
success (Boggess, 1998; Goldin, 1998; Chen, 2011; Heckman & LaFonatine, 2012; 
Iatarola & Reubenstein, 2007; Murnane, 2013). Arguments for using graduation rates as 
an accountability measure usually contend that since high school graduation actually 
translates into real-world outcomes, such as college attendance, employment, and 
earnings, it may be a more telling representation of student success.  As Hanushek (1986) 
states, “existing empirical evidence is inconclusive about the strength of the link between 
test scores and subsequent achievement outside of schools,” (p 1154), supporting the idea 
of using a representation of student achievement that does not involve standardized test 
performance (Hanushek, 1986).  
In contrast, a section of the literature also includes evidence against using graduation 
rates because of the way they are currently reported under NCLB. Because NCLB 
vaguely defines the high school graduation rate as “the percentage of students who 
graduate from secondary school with a regular diploma in the standard number of years,” 
high school districts have the ability to overreport their graduation rates, thereby “gaming 
the system” (Alliance for Excellent Education, 2008). Due to the disparities in the ways 
states report high school graduation rates, some see them as a more unreliable outcome 
measure than those related to standardized tests. However, it is important to consider 
alternative accountability measures in order to create a more holistic understanding of 
student academic achievement; thus, this paper studies the effects of the above school and 
community characteristics on raw growth in graduation rates (defined in equation 5) in 
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order to see whether the characteristics affect growth in high school graduation rates 
differently than they do grade 11 pass rate growth.  
 
(5)           
 
Graduation Rate Growth =  Graduation Rate2012 −  Graduation Rate2003 
 
 
Several papers argue that test scores and high school graduation rates somewhat 
oppose each other in education. For example, Wenger (2000) argues that schools actually 
face multiple outputs in education, test scores and graduation rates, which act like perfect 
substitutes. Carnoy (2005) argues that NCLB’s initiative to improve student academic 
performance could potentially have negative effects on high school graduation rates. 
Although efforts to improve performance in elementary schools are likely to translate into 
high academic achievement in high schools, Carnoy suggests that if accountability 
measures include raising minimum requirements for high school graduation in the form 
of exit exams, which many states do, this could lower graduation rates by placing a 
barrier on high school graduation for lower-achieving students (Carnoy, 2005, p. 20). 
Thus, these are reasons to consider measures of student educational success that do not 
involve test scores as alternative accountability measures. As with the pass rate-related 
growth variables, I am interested in estimating the effects of community and school 
characteristics and test score-related variables on graduation rate growth.  
 
(6)         
 
Graduation Rate Growth =  β0 + βX1,i + φX2,i + γTest Scorei +ε i 
 
 
The regressions using the graduation rate as the outcome variable use the same input 
variables as the regressions related to pass rates and pass rate growth; X1,i is a vector of 
school characteristics again and X2,i is a vector of community characteristics. In addition 
to those variables, I also include one input variable relating to test scores, following 
Wenger (2000), captured in the model by γTest Scorei. There are four models used for 
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these regressions. The first includes the 2012 pass rate as an independent variable; the 
second includes raw pass rate growth; the third includes percent pass rate gain; the fourth 
includes percent of gap closed. If the coefficients on the pass rate-related variables are 
zero, then this indicates that test scores have no effect on graduation rates. 
Tables 17, 18, 19, and 20 show the results for the above regressions. Table 17 
displays results for the four models in math and reading for growth in high school 
graduation rates for all students; tables 18, 19, and 20 display results for white, black, and 
Hispanic subgroups, respectively. 
 
B. Results 
The regressions on graduation rates display very interesting trends, especially when 
compared to the results of the regressions on grade 11 pass rate growth. In particular, as 
with the regressions on pass rate growth, the local BA rate positively affects graduation 
rate growth for all students and for the subgroup of white students and negatively affects 
that of the Hispanic subgroup. The local BA rate also positively affects growth in black 
high school graduation rates but negatively affects all definitions of black pass rate 
growth in both subjects.  
The effect of the percent of black students in a district on high school graduation rate 
growth is negative, while that of Hispanic students is positive. This effect can be 
explained by the growth in high school graduation rates from 2003 to 2012 by these 
respective subgroups, shown in Table 15. As the table shows, for all students and all three 
subgroups under analysis, high school graduation rates actually declined over the period. 
The Hispanic subgroup experienced the smallest decline, 3.93 percentage points, and the 
black subgroup experienced the largest decline of 7.42 percentage points. This large 
decrease for black students likely negatively affected the all-student average, while the 
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relatively small decrease for Hispanics probably positively affected the all-student 
average. 
The own-race effects for the three subgroups under analysis are quite similar. For 
example, increases in the percentage of white students in a district decrease graduation 
rate growth at very small magnitudes. The same is true for the black and Hispanic 
subgroups. Since each subgroup experienced a decline in pass rates over the period, it is 
no surprise that increased representation of that subgroup results in a negative effect on 
that group’s overall growth in graduation rates. This result could also have implications 
about diversity in school districts. Perhaps this again asserts that diversity in districts is 
important for student success, and that an overwhelming representation of one subgroup 
of students negatively affects that group’s overall educational achievement. 
The effects of the percentage of highly qualified teachers on growth in high school 
graduation rates compare very interestingly to the effects on pass rate-related variables. 
The effects of the percentage of highly qualified teachers on raw pass rate growth, 
percent pass rate gain, and percent of gap closed are relatively indiscernible for all 
grades, subjects, and subgroups; sometimes the percent of highly qualified teachers 
positively influences the growth definitions, and other times it affects the growth 
definitions negatively, and this effect is rarely statistically significant. But this variable 
always has a positive effect on growth in high school graduation rates for all students and 
each of the subgroups under analysis. This is often statistically significant for all students 
and white students, and is often statistically significant for black students. That teachers 
do not have a definitive effect on student performance when measured using standardized 
test pass rates but have an always positive, often significant effect on student 
performance when measured with high school graduation rates could have several 
implications.  
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First, this result may suggest that the growth in graduation rates may be more 
indicative of student success than pass rate-related variables. As it is widely recognized 
that teachers are a crucial component in the educational success of students, one would 
hope that, instead of having an indiscernible effect on educational outcomes, teachers 
would always positively shape student success, and this does occur when measuring 
student success with growth in high school graduation rates (though still not usually with 
statistical significance).20 Furthermore, that teachers have mixed effects on pass-rate 
related variables but always positively affect graduation rates may say something about 
their priorities with respect to education. Maybe this indicates that teachers, on average, 
have mixed opinions about standardized testing, but have positive opinions of graduation 
as a measure of student success, and work harder towards students achieving the latter 
than the former. This may support the notion of competing outcomes in education. 
In contrast, the above results could actually provide evidence that growth in pass rates 
is actually a more reliable measure than growth in high school graduation rates. If 
teachers do, in fact, prioritize students graduating over students improving standardized 
test performance, this trend could constitute an argument for using standardized test 
scores as a measure of student success over graduation rates. If teachers are more 
impartial towards standardized tests than high school graduation, pass rate-related 
variables could be more unbiased accountability measures. 
Another trend that shows evidence of competing outcomes in education is the effects 
of pass rate-related variables on high school graduation rates. For all students and the 
subgroup of white students, the effects of the 2012 grade 11 pass rate, raw pass rate 
growth, percent pass rate gain, and percent of gap closed are all negative for reading and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This is one argument for directly estimating the impact of teachers on student 
achievement through value added models. This form of accountability still relies on test 
scores. 
	   51	  
positive for math with rare statistical significance. For black and Hispanic students in 
both subjects, the effect of 2012 pass rates on growth in high school graduation rates is 
negative, but the effects of all three growth definitions are positive. The positive effects 
of the growth variables reflect that increases in pass rate growth positively affect 
graduation rates; if we think of improved standardized pass rates as indications of student 
learning, then this result makes sense. It is also possible that the absence of statistical 
significance for the effects of the pass rate-related variables on growth in high school 
graduation rates indicates a lack of relationship between the variables. 
Finally, Table 15 shows the change in high school graduation rates over the period of 
2003 to 2012 for all students and the white, black, and Hispanic subgroups. For all four 
groups of students, high school graduation rates decreased with statistical significance 
over the period. This trend is quite alarming, as grade 11 pass rates also decreased over 
the period in math and reading for all students and subgroups, except for Hispanics in 
math. With these trends, Illinois districts are showing decreases in student success as 
measured by the two conventional measures in place. This is not to say that all districts 
exhibited decreases in graduation rates and pass rates over the period – actually, 124 
districts experienced positive growth in high school graduation rates and 8 experienced 
no change. However, an overwhelming majority of districts did experience a decline in 
graduation rates overall. This is quite contrary to the objective of education legislation, 
which aims to improve student skills (and therefore hopefully educational outcomes), not 
make outcomes like high school graduation more difficult to attain.21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This decrease in graduation rates could also be due to the implementation of graduation 
requirements that are more difficult to attain. Carnoy (2005) addresses this, suggesting 
that raising requirements could encourage lower-achieving students to not graduate, and 
pursue GEDs or other alternative programs instead, and therefore lower the graduation 
rate. 
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Perhaps the greatest implication of these results is that there is evidence of competing 
outcomes in education, and we need to consider this when choosing a metric to best 
evaluate student success. The above results at times support using growth in graduation 
rates as a measure, but there are viable reasons to not do so as well. Ultimately, policy 
makers must be more mindful of how they empirically evaluate student progress over 
time, carefully choosing the proper accountability measure to employ in future 
legislation. 
 
VII. Conclusion and Future Research 
Several trends that have emerged from the above analyses have serious policy 
implications. First of all, the results show that empirical measures used to define student 
growth should take into account where students started at the beginning of the period in 
question. In terms of the standardized test-related definitions of growth used in this paper, 
one may consider using percent pass rate gain or percent of gap closed instead of raw 
pass rate growth, as they actually account for the original pass rate, and are therefore 
more informative. Measuring how students have improved relative to where they started 
would be better for NCLB as well. Perhaps instead of using AYP, which is just a raw 
amount of growth from year to year, policy makers should employ a more revealing 
accountability measure such as percent gain or percent of gap closed in order to more 
accurately and holistically measure student progress. Based on the regression results, it is 
clear that policy makers could employ a more appropriate measure of pass rate growth. 
Because federal funding is at stake for districts that do not meet the requirements of AYP, 
it is imperative to use the most appropriate measure of growth in order for the 
Department of Education to correctly impose funding sanctions. That percent gain and 
percent of gap closed better capture improvements in student outcomes than raw growth 
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shows evidence that the current system of evaluating student progress is problematic, and 
should change. 
Changing the current system of evaluation does not have to involve the development 
of new standardized tests or defining success with respect to standardized test 
performance at all. This paper suggests that using high school graduation rates as an 
additional outcome variable in the education production function actually better captures 
the effects of certain determinants of student educational success, such as the effect of the 
percent of highly qualified teachers, than the pass rate regressions. Furthermore, some 
scholars believe that test score-related variables are not the best measures of student 
educational success because they do not directly translate into real life outcomes, such as 
access to employment and higher income opportunities, the way a variable like 
graduation rates does. One could consider using variables, such as the percent of students 
planning to attend college or earnings after graduating high school as alternative outcome 
measures as well. Future policies could use other accountability measures that are not 
related to standardized test performance in order to better understand education, or at the 
very least, consider the metric chosen to better represent improvements in student 
outcomes.  
With new accountability measures, policy makers can better address the combination 
of school and community factors that impact student outcomes – something that the 
current version of NCLB does not account for. One way to begin a practice of accounting 
for community influences on student educational improvement would be to include 
community data on the annual report cards that NCLB required districts to produce. 
Because school districts may not be able to completely control for community 
characteristics that influence educational success of students, it is possible that all of the 
responsibility for student outcomes should not rest completely on the school districts in 
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terms of the academic services they provide. The statistically significant effects of the 
local BA rate and the racial makeup of the school district on both outcome measures 
related to pass rates and to high school graduation rates have provided evidence of this in 
this paper. School districts themselves might not be best equipped to overcome factors 
that pre-exist in a community in order to produce student success; legislators must 
understand this when formulating future education policy, so that they can more 
accurately capture determinants of student success and correctly impose school district 
funding sanctions.22  
One implication that arises out of this study is that racial make-up of a school district 
is imperative to student success, especially in addressing the achievement gap. As shown 
in the results from the own-race effects, white, black, and Hispanic students generally 
benefit from an increased presence of other students of their race in school districts. This 
could powerfully influence federal education policy because the government could 
mandate that districts exhibit a “healthy mix” of students in order to maximize student 
educational performance. However, it may not be that simple, as diversity is a difficult 
concept to capture empirically. More work should certainly be done to determine what 
constitutes a “healthy mix.” Figures 2 and 3 do show some evidence that a quadratic best 
fit curve could be more appropriate for the percent of black students than a line, and I 
would like to further explore this by adjusting the functional form of race variables. In 
particular, I would like to vary the own-race regressions by squaring the race variables in 
order to see if there is, in fact, a percentage of black, Hispanic, and white students in a 
district that would maximize student performance of that race and of all races. If the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For example, instead of firing teachers in districts that repeatedly do not meet AYP, 
the federal government could mandate that districts engage more with their communities, 
taking advantage of community characteristics that should positively affect student 
educational achievement. 
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white and Hispanic subgroups display similar trends to black students, this could have 
important consequences regarding optimal levels of diversity in schools, and could lead 
to policy that calls for school districts increasing racial integration.23 
Furthermore, threatening a reduction of federal funding for districts that do not meet 
AYP may not be the most effective policy based on the above results. In all three grades, 
the effects of increases in per pupil instructional expenditures on all three measures of 
growth are negative, suggesting that throwing money at the problem of a lack of 
improvement in certain areas—such as math and reading that are heavily assessed in 
current tests – does not necessarily solve the problem of improving educational 
outcomes. Perhaps the federal solution for districts that are not improving enough should 
encompass more than just a threatened withholding of funds, as expenditures are clearly 
not the only variable that affects student outcomes. The results of this paper have shown 
that there are many significant determinants of student educational success that actually 
do not involve per pupil expenditures. Perhaps, the federal government should turn its 
focus to addressing those factors by working in concert with state and local governments 
and school boards.  Since community factors significantly influence student success, 
local- or state-level reform or legislation, rather than federal legislation, might lead to 
better results. For example, policy could require the implementation of tutoring programs 
in the communities of lower-achieving districts or the implementation of new school 
integration efforts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Because diversity and own-race effects are so difficult to empirically capture, it is 
important to consider other race-related factors that could affect educational outcomes. 
The above model could suffer from omitted variable bias because other race-related 
variables that were not included could contribute to educational outcomes. For example, 
adding the percent of teachers in a district who are Hispanic as an independent variable in 
the Hispanic own-race regressions may yield results that further explain the influence of 
race on student performance. 
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The above analyses have produced results that suggest that a combination of school 
district and community characteristics do affect student educational outcomes, a 
conclusion that is consistent with the literature. However, the results still leave questions 
about how to most effectively capture student improvement, since certain inputs in the 
education production function produce very different effects on different definitions of 
student improvement. Perhaps that is why there are so many education production 
function estimates – there does not seem to be one widely accepted “best” way to capture 
student educational performance and its determinants. Due to this, there is much more 
that I would like to explore in regard to the education production function. 
A useful follow up study would include more data to analyze student performance at 
the school level, rather than the school district level. I restricted this study to the school 
district level because expenditure data was only reported at the district level. By 
foregoing this variable, student performance across Illinois schools could be analyzed, 
which would increase sample size substantially. Data from at least one intermediate year 
between 2003 and 2012 would help understand trends in pass rates found in this study. 
One question this additional data would answer would be if grade 11 experienced a 
steady decline in pass rates from 2003 to 2012 or if pass rates increased until a certain 
year and decreased after that. Obtaining more data would definitely enhance 
understanding of trends. 
An examination of differences in pass rates between racial subgroups over the period 
of NCLB would assess whether the Act’s goal of closing the achievement gap, or 
increasing the performance of low-achieving subgroups relative to higher-achieving 
subgroups, was achieved. Additional studies should explore whether reductions in the 
achievement gap can be explained using the education production function model 
employed in this paper. 
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In addition to performing regressions on the closing of the achievement gap, 
additional investigations should be done on the effects of district and community 
characteristics on subgroups of the population other than racial ones. For example, 
because American education legislation has targeted disadvantaged students (Title I, 
NCLB), it is important to see how the variables in this paper’s proposed education 
production function estimate affect the subgroup of low-income students. Other 
subgroups that should be analyzed include Limited English Proficient students and 
students with Individualized Education Programs.  
Finally, with the recent expiration of NCLB and the implementation of the new 
Common Core Standards Initiative has come a shift from state-set standards to national 
standards. This shift should motivate other studies using similar data in other states and 
investigate whether the variables used in this paper have similar effects on student 
outcomes in states other than Illinois. Proving that community characteristics are useful 
in measuring student success extend in other states could then influence federal action 
and a more just and useful revision to NCLB.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 
Pass Rates 
 Reading Math 
 N 2003 Pass Rate 
2012  
Pass Rate 
Growai 
(pp) 
Gainii 
(%) 
Gapiii 
(%) N 
2003  
Pass Rate 
2012 
Pass Rate 
Growai 
(pp) 
Gainii 
(%) 
Gapiii 
(%) 
All Races   
Grade 3 663 71.30 80.36 9.07 15.72 22.41 663 84.67 91.37 6.70 9.40 33.38 
Grade 8 653 67.31 87.02 19.71 32.78 59.39 653 59.48 86.34 26.86 55.03 66.04 
Grade 11 427 57.06 52.97 -4.08 -6.30 -12.07 427 53.30 51.53 -1.76 -1.98 -5.59 
White   
Grade 3 630 74.78 83.17 8.33 12.90 23.75 630 87.36 93.39 5.93 7.68 36.84 
Grade 8 628 69.94 88.60 18.55 29.33 60.98 628 63.02 88.40 25.16 45.84 68.05 
Grade 11 424 59.44 56.74 -2.71 -3.41 -9.16 424 55.46 55.34 -0.14 -1.40 -1.79 
Black   
Grade 3 137 46.87 67.00 19.85 53.61 34.82 137 64.89 77.93 13.19 25.34 25.10 
Grade 8 140 47.72 76.94 27.36 68.96 50.39 140 27.86 71.34 41.98 189.93 58.13 
Grade 11 86 33.91 27.12 -8.29 -21.82 -15.97 86 25.00 23.06 -3.85 -6.44 -7.42 
Hispanic   
Grade 3 155 57.02 71.36 12.73 29.51 21.88 156 77.18 85.94 8.16 13.58 20.64 
Grade 8 142 49.79 84.40 33.90 83.41 64.54 142 40.72 82.97 41.20 131.39 68.70 
Grade 11 94 39.42 38.92 -1.05 -3.15 -4.48 94 36.41 49.09 3.80 20.69 3.51 
a This is the only growth variable being statistically tested. Pass rate growth is statistically significant at the 1% level for all grades, subgroups, and 
subjects except for grade 11 white math and grade 11 Hispanic reading. 
i Corresponds to equation (1) in section III 
ii Corresponds to equation (2) in section III 
iii Corresponds to equation (3) in section III 
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Table 2 
Difference in Differences in Pass Rates Between Races 
 Reading Math 
 2003 2012 Diff-in-Diff 2003 2012 Diff-in-Diff 
 White and Black Subgroups  
Grade 3 26.70 16.59 -9.49*** 20.60 15.62 -4.90*** 
 Grade 8 23.23 11.42 -10.77*** 34.57 16.05 -17.25*** 
Grade 11 29.33 34.25 -6.00*** 33.87 38.49 6.25*** 
 White and Hispanic Subgroups 
Grade 3 16.92 13.46 -1.69 9.71 7.53 -1.65* 
Grade 8 21.29 5.70 -15.61*** 22.32 6.31 -16.42*** 
Grade 11 25.23 23.29 -0.39 25.21 23.67 -1.00 
*** signifies statistical significance at the 1% level 
** signifies statistical significance at the 5% level 
* signifies statistical significance at the 10% level 
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  Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 2003 2012 
 Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Districts with Grade 3 and 8 ISAT Scoresa         
Local BA Rate 23.78 14.91 3.1 88.7 23.78 14.91 3.1 88.7 
Percent Students White 83.03 23.84 0 100 75.47 27.14 0 99.6 
Percent Students Black 8.43 18.93 0 100 8.7 18.98 0 100 
Percent Students Hispanic 6.15 11.35 0 94.2 10.07 15.34 0 94 
Grade 3 Average Class Size 20.68 3.80 5 36 20.6 3.97 5 35 
Grade 8 Average Class Size 21.51 4.71 8.9 40 20.3 4.75 7.3 39.4 
Grade 3 Daily Minutes of Eng. Inst. 142.19 27.76 40 220 138.63 27.15 43 230 
Grade 3 Daily Minutes of Math Inst. 58.14 9.82 30 100 61.77 11.1 30 120 
Grade 8 Daily Minutes of Eng Inst. 86.83 20.67 15 282 86.08 18.14 37 151 
Grade 8 Daily Minutes of Math Inst. 46.47 11.92 23 235 49.21 11.26 38 105 
District Mobility Rate 14.18 7.39 0.6 40.9 12.88 7.66 0.7 55 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified 99.27 3.35 31.6 100 99.87 0.83 88.6 100 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures 4.30 0.90 2.33 10.45 5.94 1.45 3.41 15.09 
Center City Districts 3.32 17.92 0 100 3.32 17.92 0 100 
Suburban Districts 80.54 39.62 0 100 80.54 39.62 0 100 
Rural Districts 16.14 36.81 0 100 16.14 36.81 0 100 
Districts with Grade 11 PSAE Scoresb         
Local BA Rate 21.52 12.41 3.1 79.4 21.52 12.41 3.1 79.4 
Percent Students White 88.51 17.98 0.2 100 82.47 21.44 0.5 99.5 
Percent Students Black 5.59 13.35 0 98.7 5.88 13.54 0 98.4 
Percent Students Hispanic 4.43 9.20 0 76.8 7.44 12.51 0 87.7 
Grade 11 Average Class Size 17.89 3.83 7.9 31 16.51 4.18 7.1 31 
District Mobility Rate 12.82 5.97 1.9 40.1 12.47 6.33 0.9 55 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified 99.29 2.47 73.1 100 99.86 0.89 88.6 100 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures 4.52 1.06 2.86 9.42 6.09 1.53 3.72 12.67 
Center City Districts 2.58 15.86 0 100 2.58 15.86 0 100 
Suburban Districts 74.71 43.52 0 100 74.71 43.52 0 100 
Rural Districts 22.72 41.95 0 100 22.72 41.95 0 100 
a	  After dropping extreme outliers, there are 663 elementary and unit districts in the grade 3 analysis and 653 districts in the grade 8 analysis. 
b	  There are 427 high school and unit districts in the grade 11 analysis. 
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  Table 4 
Grade 3 Growth in Pass Rates by Subject: All Races 
 Reading Math 
 Grow Gain Gap Grow Gain Gap 
Local BA Rate -0.08*** 
(0.03) 
 
-0.22*** 
(0.05) 
0.21* 
(0.12) 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
-0.21*** 
(0.03) 
-0.21 
(0.15) 
Percent Students Black 0.21*** 
(0.02) 
 
0.54*** 
(0.04) 
0.31*** 
(0.09) 
0.20*** 
(0.02) 
0.36*** 
(0.03) 
0.40*** 
(0.11) 
Percent Students Hispanic -0.02 
(0.02) 
 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.22*** 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.37*** 
(0.09) 
Grade 3 Average Class Size -0.28** 
(0.13) 
 
-0.58** 
(0.23) 
-0.45 
(0.53) 
-0.20** 
(0.01) 
-0.33** 
(0.15) 
-0.74 
(0.67) 
Grade 3 Curricular Minutes of Instruction 0.02* 
(0.01) 
 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.10 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
0.18 
(0.17) 
District Mobility Rate -0.29*** 
(0.06) 
 
-0.52*** 
(0.10) 
-0.93*** 
(0.24) 
-0.29*** 
(0.04) 
-0.37*** 
(0.07) 
-1.66*** 
(0.29) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified 0.11 
(0.34) 
 
0.28 
(0.62) 
-0.27 
(1.42) 
0.24 
(0.27) 
0.53 
(0.41) 
-0.55 
(1.78) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures -0.53* 
(0.32) 
 
-0.65 
(0.59) 
-1.23 
(1.38) 
-0.28 
(0.26) 
-0.32 
(0.40) 
-2.50 
(1.74) 
Constant 9.45 
(33.81) 
 
8.01 
(61.86) 
13.29 
(143.17) 
-4.39 
(27.19) 
-25.89 
(41.78) 
140.87 
(179.93) 
R2 0.1671 0.2997 0.0901 0.2613 0.3173 0.0854 
N = 663 elementary and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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  Table 5 
Grade 8 Growth in Pass Rates by Subject: All Races 
 Reading Math 
 Grow Gain Gap Grow Gain Gap 
Local BA Rate -0.19*** 
(0.02) 
 
-0.47*** 
(0.05) 
0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.25*** 
(0.03) 
-0.95*** 
(0.09) 
0.13** 
(0.04) 
Percent Students Black 0.03 
(0.02) 
 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.17*** 
(0.02) 
1.08*** 
(0.08) 
-0.10*** 
(0.04) 
Percent Students Hispanic 0.17*** 
(0.01) 
 
0.54*** 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.16*** 
(0.02) 
0.74*** 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Grade 8 Average Class Size -0.21*** 
(0.06) 
 
-0.57*** 
(0.14) 
-0.06 
(0.14) 
-0.20** 
(0.08) 
0.47* 
(0.26) 
0.15 
(0.13) 
Grade 8 Curricular Minutes of Instruction 0.01 
(0.02) 
 
-0.004 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.21*** 
(0.03) 
0.60*** 
(0.09) 
0.25*** 
(0.04) 
District Mobility Rate -0.02 
(0.04) 
 
0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.31*** 
(0.10) 
-0.19*** 
(0.06) 
-0.59*** 
(0.19) 
-0.44*** 
(0.09) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified -0.03 
(0.29) 
 
0.45 
(0.65) 
0.71 
(0.67) 
-0.10 
(0.37) 
-0.44 
(1.22) 
0.76 
(0.59) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures -0.67*** 
(0.24) 
 
-1.29** 
(0.55) 
-0.17 
(0.57) 
-1.29*** 
(0.32) 
-2.48** 
(1.05) 
-1.13** 
(0.50) 
Constant 38.12 
(31.44) 
 
22.99 
(64.92) 
-13.22 
(66.90) 
45.48 
(37.09) 
111.99 
(122.08) 
-16.48 
(58.91) 
R2 0.4506 0.5833 0.1753 0.4808 0.6201 0.1826 
N = 653 elementary and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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  Table 6 
Grade 11 Growth in Pass Rates by Subject: All Races 
 Reading Math 
 Grow Gain Gap Grow Gain Gap 
Local BA Rate 0.08** 
(0.03) 
 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.23*** 
(0.07) 
0.20** 
(0.09) 
Percent Students Black -0.12*** 
(0.02) 
 
-0.36*** 
(0.04) 
-0.16** 
(0.07) 
-0.08*** 
(0.03) 
-0.31*** 
(0.06) 
-0.12* 
(0.07) 
Percent Students Hispanic -0.05** 
(0.02) 
 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
Grade 11 Average Class Size -0.04 
(0.12) 
 
-0.08 
(0.21) 
0.20 
(0.33) 
-0.05 
(0.14) 
-0.22 
(0.28) 
0.23 
(0.33) 
District Mobility Rate -0.08 
(0.06) 
 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
-0.16 
(0.16) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
-0.14 
(0.17) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified -0.40 
(0.38) 
 
0.29 
(0.67) 
-1.68* 
(1.03) 
-1.22*** 
(0.43) 
-2.49*** 
(0.89) 
-2.56** 
(1.06) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures -0.25 
(0.23) 
 
0.57 
(0.41) 
-0.49 
(0.63) 
-0.55** 
(0.26) 
-1.27** 
(0.54) 
-1.07* 
(0.65) 
Constant 36.67 
(37.57) 
 
-29.93 
(67.03) 
152.81 
(102.48) 
119.63 
(42.61) 
249.84 
(88.16) 
243.11 
(105.55) 
R2 0.1921 0.3469 0.0682 0.1645 0.2191 0.1094 
N = 427 high school and unit districts  
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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  Table 7 
Grade 3 Growth in Pass Rates by Subject: White Students 
 Reading Math 
 Grow Gain Gap Grow Gain Gap 
Local BA Rate -0.07*** 
(0.03) 
 
-0.20*** 
(0.04) 
0.38*** 
(0.14) 
-0.12*** 
(0.02) 
-0.18*** 
(0.03) 
0.19 
(0.17) 
Percent Students White 0.004 
(0.02) 
 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.32*** 
(0.09) 
Grade 3 Average Class Size 0.03 
(0.13) 
 
-0.07 
(0.20) 
0.60 
(0.63) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.18 
(0.12) 
-1.09 
(0.78) 
Grade 3 Curricular Minutes of Instruction 0.05*** 
(0.01) 
 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.23*** 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.25 
(0.21) 
District Mobility Rate -0.20*** 
(0.05) 
 
-0.32*** 
(0.08) 
-0.80*** 
(0.25) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
-1.38*** 
(0.31) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified -0.62* 
(0.35) 
 
-0.25 
(0.57) 
-2.60 
(1.76) 
-0.003 
(0.26) 
0.24 
(0.35) 
-1.85 
(2.17) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures 0.28 
(0.33) 
 
0.28 
(0.54) 
2.32 
(1.68) 
0.19 
(0.25) 
0.21 
(0.33) 
-1.85 
(2.17) 
Constant 69.14 
(33.93) 
 
46.61 
(56.20) 
232.96 
(174.60) 
15.51 
(26.07) 
0.51 
(34.98) 
231.14 
(217.04) 
R2 0.0590 0.0686 0.1278 0.0976 0.1176 0.1002 
N = 630 elementary and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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  Table 8 
Grade 8 Growth in Pass Rates by Subject: White Students 
 Reading Math 
 Grow Gain Gap Grow Gain Gap 
Local BA Rate -0.28*** 
(0.03) 
 
-0.63*** 
(0.06) 
0.26*** 
(0.06) 
-0.30*** 
(0.03) 
-0.89*** 
(0.08) 
0.25*** 
(0.05) 
Percent Students White 0.07*** 
(0.01) 
 
0.22*** 
(0.03) 
-0.06* 
(0.03) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.19*** 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Grade 8 Average Class Size -0.03 
(0.08) 
 
-0.14 
(0.18) 
0.23 
(0.17) 
-0.17** 
(0.08) 
-0.60*** 
(0.23) 
0.15 
(0.13) 
Grade 8 Curricular Minutes of Instruction 0.01 
(0.02) 
 
0.004 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.37*** 
(0.08) 
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
District Mobility Rate -0.17*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.31*** 
(0.12) 
-0.56*** 
(0.11) 
-0.26*** 
(0.06) 
-0.63*** 
(0.15) 
-0.57*** 
(0.09) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified 0.92** 
(0.43) 
 
3.40*** 
(1.01) 
1.20 
(0.96) 
-0.47 
(0.47) 
0.47 
(1.30) 
-.062 
(0.76) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures -0.63** 
(0.30) 
 
-1.47** 
(0.71) 
-0.23 
(0.67) 
-1.22*** 
(0.33) 
-2.36*** 
(0.92) 
-1.51*** 
(0.54) 
Constant -52.43 
(42.00) 
 
-258.77 
(98.66) 
-57.28 
(93.79) 
96.69 
(36.53) 
61.22 
(127.55) 
130.71 
(74.59) 
R2 0.2868 0.2971 0.1754 0.3547 0.3764 0.2000 
N = 628 elementary and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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  Table 9 
Grade 11 Growth in Pass Rates by Subject: White Students 
 Reading Math 
 Grow Gain Gap Grow Gain Gap 
Local BA Rate 0.11** 
(0.03) 
 
0.18*** 
(0.05) 
0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
0.37*** 
(0.10) 
Percent Students White 0.06*** 
(0.02) 
 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.15*** 
(0.06) 
0.0001 
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
Grade 11 Average Class Size 0.27** 
(0.12) 
 
0.39* 
(0.22) 
0.90** 
(0.35) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
0.13 
(0.28) 
0.86** 
(0.40) 
District Mobility Rate -0.04 
(0.06) 
 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.16) 
-0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.10 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified -1.18** 
(0.50) 
 
-1.77** 
(0.87) 
-3.52** 
(1.42) 
-0.88 
(0.58) 
-1.47 
(1.13) 
-2.10 
(1.63) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures -0.05 
(0.25) 
 
-0.16 
(0.43) 
0.28 
(0.70) 
-0.34 
(0.29) 
-0.86 
(0.55) 
0.06 
(0.81) 
Constant 101.62 
(48.91) 
 
153.10 
(84.50) 
300.44 
(137.94) 
80.87 
(56.44) 
141.57 
(109.17) 
174.25 
(157.82) 
R2 0.1359 0.1146 0.1358 0.1254 0.0788 0.1325 
N = 424 high school and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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  Table 10 
Grade 3 Growth in Pass Rates by Subject: Black Students 
 Reading Math 
 Grow Gain Gap Grow Gain Gap 
Local BA Rate 0.0001 
(0.07) 
 
-0.32 
(0.20) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
0.24 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.25) 
0.21 
(0.40) 
Percent Students Black 0.19*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.53*** 
(0.14) 
0.30*** 
(0.10) 
0.23*** 
(0.05) 
0.42*** 
(0.10) 
0.69** 
(0.27) 
Grade 3 Average Class Size -0.80* 
(0.43) 
 
-1.43 
(1.21) 
-1.22 
(0.85) 
-1.27*** 
(0.47) 
-2.58*** 
(0.86) 
-3.14 
(2.34) 
Grade 3 Curricular Minutes of Instruction 0.05 
(0.05) 
 
0.07 
(0.13) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.18) 
0.08 
(0.48) 
District Mobility Rate -0.37*** 
(0.13) 
 
-0.98*** 
(0.37) 
-0.66** 
(0.26) 
-0.50*** 
(0.14) 
-0.85*** 
(0.26) 
-1.31* 
(0.72) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified -0.90 
(0.69) 
 
1.14 
(1.92) 
2.18 
(1.35) 
0.92 
(0.75) 
1.59 
(1.39) 
1.06 
(3.78) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures 0.75 
(1.03) 
 
2.20 
(2.88) 
1.46 
(2.01) 
-1.96* 
(1.12) 
-3.86* 
(2.07) 
-4.29 
(5.63) 
Constant -65.13 
(69.10) 
 
-49.92 
(193.38) 
-182.40 
(135.45) 
-38.95 
(76.46) 
-50.88 
(141.21) 
12.29 
(384.36) 
R2 0.2033 0.1918 0.1883 0.2193 0.2261 0.0824 
N = 137 elementary and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
	  
	  
	   74	  
  Table 11 
Grade 8 Growth in Pass Rates by Subject: Black Students 
 Reading Math 
 Grow Gain Gap Grow Gain Gap 
Local BA Rate -0.15** 
(0.08) 
 
-0.89*** 
(0.24) 
0.06 
(0.15) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
-1.67*** 
(0.57) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
Percent Students Black -0.07 
(0.05) 
 
-0.30* 
(0.18) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.41 
(0.41) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
Grade 8 Average Class Size -0.25 
(0.24) 
 
-1.00 
(0.79) 
-0.45 
(0.50) 
0.23 
(0.25) 
0.41 
(1.73) 
0.34 
(0.31) 
Grade 8 Curricular Minutes of Instruction -0.02 
(0.06) 
 
0.03 
(0.20) 
-0.11 
(0.13) 
0.18** 
(0.08) 
-0.10 
(0.53) 
0.27*** 
(0.09) 
District Mobility Rate 0.05 
(0.14) 
 
0.26 
(0.45) 
-0.07 
(0.28) 
-0.29** 
(0.14) 
-1.15 
(1.01) 
-0.40** 
(0.18) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified -0.55 
(0.79) 
 
-2.67 
(2.56) 
0.21 
(1.61) 
-0.01 
(0.82) 
-10.45* 
(5.77) 
1.13 
(1.02) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures -0.46 
(0.96) 
 
0.35 
(3.13) 
-0.48 
(1.96) 
0.09 
(1.01) 
-3.80 
(7.09) 
0.71 
(1.25) 
Constant 102.75 
(78.68) 
 
405.04 
(255.27) 
55.43 
(160.34) 
37.87 
(82.30) 
1351.22 
(577.43) 
-77.13 
(101.83) 
R2 0.1702 0.3102 0.0329 0.1366 0.2437 0.1730 
N = 140 elementary and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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  Table 12 
Grade 11 Growth in Pass Rates by Subject: Black Students 
 Reading Math 
 Grow Gain Gap Grow Gain Gap 
Local BA Rate -0.25*** 
(0.10) 
 
-0.29 
(0.24) 
-0.74*** 
(0.21) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
-0.002 
(0.31) 
-0.35** 
(0.16) 
Percent Students Black 0.03 
(0.08) 
 
-0.05 
(0.19) 
0.11 
(0.17) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.08 
(0.25) 
0.09 
(0.13) 
Grade 11 Average Class Size 0.96* 
(0.49) 
 
1.68 
(1.22) 
2.47** 
(1.08) 
0.62 
(0.43) 
0.95 
(1.57) 
1.42* 
(0.83) 
District Mobility Rate 0.06 
(0.18) 
 
0.03 
(0.46) 
0.18 
(0.41) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.33 
(0.59) 
0.06 
(0.31) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified 0.29 
(0.94) 
 
2.58 
(2.36) 
-0.23 
(2.10) 
-0.62 
(0.84) 
-0.91 
(3.05) 
-1.11 
(1.61) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures 0.63 
(0.81) 
 
0.64 
(2.02) 
1.91 
(1.80) 
0.07 
(0.72) 
-0.14 
(2.61) 
0.46 
(1.38) 
Constant -54.01 
(94.12) 
 
-303.30 
(235.44) 
-35.86 
(209.32) 
47.98 
(83.40) 
60.21 
(303.54) 
80.37 
(160.05) 
R2 0.1164 0.0607 0.1933 0.0725 0.0198 0.1167 
N = 86 high school and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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  Table 13 
Grade 3 Growth in Pass Rates by Subject: Hispanic Students 
 Reading Math 
 Grow Gain Gap Grow Gain Gap 
Local BA Rate -0.29*** 
(0.10) 
 
-0.60*** 
(0.21) 
-0.63** 
(0.26) 
-0.21** 
(0.08) 
-0.33** 
(0.13) 
-1.43** 
(0.60) 
Percent Students Hispanic -0.13** 
(0.06) 
 
-0.22* 
(0.13) 
-0.29* 
(0.16) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
0.29 
(0.36) 
Grade 3 Average Class Size -1.01** 
(0.46) 
 
-2.16** 
(1.01) 
-2.00 
(1.25) 
-0.18 
(0.40) 
-0.37 
(0.62) 
-2.03 
(2.83) 
Grade 3 Curricular Minutes of Instruction 0.10* 
(0.06) 
 
0.20 
(0.12) 
0.19 
(0.15) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.37 
(0.64) 
District Mobility Rate -0.47*** 
(0.14) 
 
-0.79** 
(0.31) 
-1.27*** 
(0.38) 
-0.33*** 
(0.12) 
-0.36* 
(0.19) 
-3.03*** 
(0.86) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified -0.68 
(0.84) 
 
-1.29 
(1.85) 
-1.58 
(2.28) 
-0.22 
(0.73) 
0.10 
(1.14) 
-2.08 
(5.11) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures -1.62 
(1.16) 
 
-3.56 
(2.55) 
-3.17 
(3.14) 
-1.11* 
(1.01) 
-1.43 
(1.56) 
-10.70 
(7.17) 
Constant 118.80 
(85.33) 
 
235.90 
(187.36) 
265.67 
(231.15) 
57.70 
(75.01) 
64.25 
(116.83) 
456.44 
(524.28) 
R2 0.1710 0.1568 0.1223 0.1089 0.0983 0.1351 
N = 155 elementary and unit districts  
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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  Table 14 
Grade 8 Growth in Pass Rates by Subject: Hispanic Students 
 Reading Math 
 Grow Gain Gap Grow Gain Gap 
Local BA Rate -0.03 
(0.09) 
 
-0.38 
(0.30) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
0.35 
(0.53) 
0.20** 
(0.10) 
Percent Students Hispanic 0.17*** 
(0.05) 
 
-0.61*** 
(0.19) 
0.12* 
(0.08) 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
0.99*** 
(0.34) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
Grade 8 Average Class Size -0.27 
(0.24) 
 
-1.10 
(0.82) 
-0.09 
(0.33) 
-0.28 
(0.25) 
-2.17 
(1.41) 
0.20 
(0.26) 
Grade 8 Curricular Minutes of Instruction -0.11* 
(0.06) 
 
-0.45** 
(0.21) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
0.21*** 
(0.08) 
0.97** 
(0.45) 
0.22*** 
(0.08) 
District Mobility Rate -0.04 
(0.13) 
 
-0.30** 
(0.45) 
-0.06 
(0.18) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
-0.81 
(0.80) 
-0.16 
(0.14) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified -0.23 
(0.84) 
 
-3.26 
(2.88) 
1.31 
(1.16) 
-0.40 
(0.86) 
-7.20 
(4.89) 
1.35 
(0.89) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures -0.47 
(0.96) 
 
-1.37 
(3.30) 
-0.17 
(1.32) 
-3.22*** 
(1.01) 
-16.99*** 
(5.73) 
-2.49** 
(1.04) 
Constant 71.51 
(84.51) 
 
477.30 
(289.37) 
-67.30 
(116.11) 
91.04 
(87.03) 
923.24 
(495.28) 
-72.13 
(89.71) 
R2 0.1890 0.2840 0.0450 0.2396 0.2590 0.1717 
N = 142 elementary and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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  Table 15 
Grade 11 Growth in Pass Rates by Subject: Hispanic Students 
 Reading Math 
 Grow Gain Gap Grow Gain Gap 
Local BA Rate -0.11 
(0.10) 
 
-0.24 
(0.26) 
-0.34 
(0.22) 
-0.27** 
(0.11) 
-0.79* 
(0.42) 
-0.55*** 
(0.19) 
Percent Students Hispanic -0.06 
(0.08) 
 
-0.25 
(0.20) 
0.08 
(0.17) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.21 
(0.32) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
Grade 11 Average Class Size 0.38 
(0.45) 
 
0.12 
(1.16) 
1.47 
(0.97) 
0.80* 
(0.48) 
3.04 
(1.86) 
1.51* 
(0.83) 
District Mobility Rate 0.11 
(0.16) 
 
0.09 
(0.43) 
0.33 
(0.36) 
-0.53*** 
(0.17) 
-1.17* 
(0.68) 
-0.87*** 
(0.30) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified 0.04 
(0.98) 
 
1.24 
(2.55) 
-0.62 
(2.13) 
-2.18** 
(1.04) 
-6.64* 
(4.02) 
-3.64** 
(1.80) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures -0.25 
(0.68) 
 
-2.79 
(1.79) 
0.95 
(1.49) 
-0.25 
(0.73) 
-3.37 
(2.85) 
0.51 
(1.27) 
District is in a Rural Area 0.29 
(0.25) 
 
1.24* 
(0.66) 
0.51 
(0.55) 
0.07 
(0.27) 
0.23 
(1.04) 
0.13 
(0.47) 
District is in a Suburban Area 0.08** 
(0.03) 
 
0.21** 
(0.08) 
0.20 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
Constant -14.75 
(97.92) 
 
-110.38 
(255.78) 
11.11 
(213.34) 
220.80 
(103.79) 
679.21 
(403.26) 
357.56 
(180.40) 
R2 0.0897 0.1319 0.1232 0.2238 0.1725 0.2313 
N = 94 high school and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level
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Table 16 
Growth in High School Graduation Rates 
 2003 2012 Growth 
All Students (427) 90.40 85.59 -4.81*** 
White Students (427) 90.96 86.45 -4.31*** 
Black Students (181) 83.68 76.25 -7.42*** 
Hispanic Students 
(214) 
85.09 81.16 -3.93** 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level
! 80!
Table 17 
Growth in High School Graduation Rates by Subject: All Races 
 Reading Math 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Local BA Rate 0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.06* 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
Percent Students Black -0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.05* 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.0002 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Percent Students Hispanic 0.0005 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Grade 11 Average Class Size 0.08 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
0.08 
(0.14) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
District Mobility Rate -0.25*** 
(0.07) 
-0.24*** 
(0.07) 
-0.24*** 
(0.07) 
-0.23*** 
(0.07) 
-0.22*** 
(0.07) 
-0.22*** 
(0.07) 
-0.23*** 
(0.07) 
-0.22*** 
(0.07) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified 2.29* 
(0.46) 
2.24* 
(0.46) 
2.29* 
(0.45) 
2.25* 
(0.46) 
2.28* 
(0.46) 
2.32* 
(0.46) 
2.25* 
(0.46) 
2.32* 
(0.46) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures -0.18 
(0.28) 
-0.24 
(0.28) 
-0.27 
(0.28) 
-0.23 
(0.28) 
-0.26 
(0.29) 
-0.19 
(0.28) 
-0.23 
(0.28) 
-0.20 
(0.28) 
2012 Grade 11 Pass Rate -0.11 
(0.07) 
   0.05 
(0.06) 
   
Grade 11 Raw Pass Rate Growth  -0.07 
(0.06) 
   0.05 
(0.05) 
  
Grade 11 Percent Pass Rate Gain   -0.08** 
(0.03) 
   -0.01 
(0.03) 
 
Grade 11 Percent of Gap Closed    -0.01 
(0.02) 
   0.03 
(0.02) 
Constant -222.89 
(45.57) 
-227.07 
(45.62) 
-231.95 
(45.36) 
-228.00 
(45.75) 
-233.54 
(45.86) 
-235.55 
(45.96) 
-228.04 
(46.04) 
-235.26 
(45.82) 
R2 0.1897 0.1883 0.1963 0.1858 0.1866 0.1873 0.1854 0.1881 
N = 427 high school and unit districts 
*** signifies statistical significance at the 1% level 
** signifies statistical significance at the 5% level 
* signifies statistical significance at the 10% level 
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Table 18 
Growth in High School Graduation Rates by Subject: White Students 
 Reading Math 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Local BA Rate 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Percent Students White -0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
Grade 11 Average Class Size 0.23* 
(0.14) 
0.26* 
(0.14) 
0.25** 
(0.14) 
0.26** 
(0.14) 
0.22 
(0.14) 
0.22 
(0.14) 
0.23* 
(0.14) 
0.22 
(0.14) 
District Mobility Rate -0.29*** 
(0.07) 
-0.29*** 
(0.07) 
-0.29*** 
(0.07) 
-0.29*** 
(0.07) 
-0.28*** 
(0.07) 
-0.29*** 
(0.07) 
-0.29*** 
(0.07) 
-0.29*** 
(0.07) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified 1.85*** 
(0.56) 
1.76*** 
(0.56) 
1.79*** 
(0.56) 
1.76*** 
(0.56) 
1.93*** 
(0.56) 
1.93*** 
(0.56) 
1.91*** 
(0.56) 
1.92*** 
(0.56) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures -0.32 
(0.28) 
-0.35 
(0.27) 
-0.35 
(0.27) 
-0.33 
(0.27) 
-0.38 
(0.28) 
-0.33 
(0.27) 
-0.33 
(0.28) 
-0.34 
(0.27) 
2012 Grade 11 Pass Rate -0.03 
(0.07) 
   0.06 
(0.05) 
   
Grade 11 Raw Pass Rate Growth  -0.09* 
(0.05) 
   0.04 
(0.05) 
  
Grade 11 Percent Pass Rate Gain   -0.05 
(0.03) 
   0.01 
(0.02) 
 
Grade 11 Percent of Gap Closed    -0.03* 
(0.02) 
   0.01 
(0.02) 
Constant -187.71 
(54.03) 
-181.21 
(53.85) 
-183.46 
(53.83) 
-180.93 
(53.89) 
-197.71 
(53.91) 
-195.97 
(53.89) 
-194.45 
(53.89) 
-195.20 
(53.84) 
R2 0.1942 0.1993 0.1979 0.1991 0.1951 0.1941 0.1932 0.1940 
N = 424 high school and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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Table 19 
Growth in High School Graduation Rates by Subject: Black Students 
 Reading Math 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Local BA Rate 0.06 
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
-0.003 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.13) 
0.005 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
0.03 
(0.14) 
Percent Students Black 0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
Grade 11 Average Class Size 0.84 
(0.64) 
0.74 
(0.70) 
0.84 
(0.70) 
0.60 
(0.70) 
0.79 
(0.64) 
0.77 
(0.70) 
0.86 
(0.69) 
0.69 
(0.70) 
District Mobility Rate 0.10 
(0.26) 
0.13 
(0.26) 
0.15 
(0.26) 
0.11 
(0.26) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.13 
(0.26) 
0.14 
(0.26) 
0.13 
(0.26) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified 1.99 
(1.34) 
2.59* 
(1.33) 
2.62* 
(1.35) 
2.64** 
(1.32) 
2.03 
(1.33) 
2.69* 
(1.34) 
2.60* 
(1.33) 
2.73** 
(1.33) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures -1.53 
(1.08) 
-1.78 
(1.14) 
-1.74 
(1.14) 
-1.90* 
(1.14) 
-1.57 
(1.07) 
-1.72 
(1.14) 
-1.71 
(1.14) 
-1.76 
(1.13) 
2012 Grade 11 Pass Rate -0.06 
(0.15) 
   -0.14 
(0.14) 
   
Grade 11 Raw Pass Rate Growth  0.11* 
(0.16) 
   0.11 
(0.18) 
  
Grade 11 Percent Pass Rate Gain   0.03 
(0.07) 
   -0.02 
(0.05) 
 
Grade 11 Percent of Gap Closed    0.10 
(0.07) 
   0.10 
(0.09) 
Constant -223.18 
(133.89) 
-277.73 
(132.89) 
-283.70 
(134.96) 
-279.94 
(131.41) 
-225.46 
(132.59) 
-288.70 
(132.95) 
-282.17 
(132.86) 
-291.73 
(132.16) 
R2 0.1245 0.2082 0.2110 0.2228 0.1311 0.2075 0.2056 0.2161 
N = 86 high school and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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Table 20 
Growth in High School Graduation Rates by Subject: Hispanic Students 
 Reading Math 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Local BA Rate -0.04 
(0.12) 
-0.23* 
(0.12) 
-0.23* 
(0.12) 
-0.22* 
(0.12) 
-0.18 
(0.13) 
-0.19 
(0.13) 
-0.18 
(0.13) 
-0.21 
(0.13) 
Percent Students Hispanic -0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.15 
(0.09) 
-0.15 
(0.09) 
-0.15 
(0.09) 
-0.19* 
(0.10) 
-0.14 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.14 
(0.10) 
Grade 11 Average Class Size 1.05** 
(0.52) 
1.12** 
(0.55) 
1.14** 
(0.55) 
1.07* 
(0.55) 
1.27** 
(0.56) 
1.06* 
(0.57) 
0.96* 
(0.55) 
1.11* 
(0.57) 
District Mobility Rate -0.04 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
-0.01 
(0.20) 
0.11 
(0.21) 
0.12 
(0.20) 
0.07 
(0.21) 
Percent of Teachers who are Highly Qualified 2.01* 
(1.22) 
1.56 
(1.19) 
1.56 
(1.19) 
1.59 
(1.19) 
1.48 
(1.20) 
1.85 
(1.24) 
2.00* 
(1.20) 
1.70 
(1.24) 
Per Pupil Instructional Expenditures 0.12 
(0.82) 
0.32 
(0.84) 
0.32 
(0.85) 
0.27 
(0.84) 
0.43 
(0.85) 
0.36 
(0.85) 
0.56 
(0.84) 
0.30 
(0.86) 
2012 Grade 11 Pass Rate -0.17 
(0.13) 
   -0.23 
(0.17) 
   
Grade 11 Raw Pass Rate Growth  0.04 
(0.13) 
   0.15 
(0.13) 
  
Grade 11 Percent Pass Rate Gain   0.002 
(0.05) 
   0.07 
(0.03) 
 
Grade 11 Percent of Gap Closed    0.05 
(0.06) 
   0.04 
(0.07) 
Constant -227.51 
(121.93) 
-182.01 
(119.70) 
-182.40 
(119.88) 
-183.13 
(119.33) 
-170.97 
(120.72) 
-213.57 
(124.07) 
-229.44 
(120.30) 
-197.57 
(124.34) 
R2 0.1906 0.1829 0.1820 0.1877 0.1990 0.1951 0.2282 0.1859 
N = 94 high school and unit districts 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
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